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A . learned man came to me onc·e 
.,··,:, --~ 
He said, · 11 I kno,1 the way - come. " 
And I was overjoyed at this. 
Together we has~ened. 
Soon, too soon were-we 
Where my eyes were useless, 
·. " ;.;_: :,. . ~·., 
And I knew not the ways of my teet. 
I clung to the hand of my friend. 
But at last he cried, "I am lost." 
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Abstract of' the Thesis 
This thesis is a st.udy of the writings of Randolph 
s. Bourne ( 1886-1918) who achi~ved a 11m1 ted degree of 
· tame in the second decade of the twentieth century as an 
\ 
essayist, literary critic, and\.educational reformer. He 
is most frequently remembered, however, as the most vocal 
and articulate critic of the First World War. In recent 
. ' 
years he has been the subject of a number of studies in 
which the authors rather uniformly concluded that he was 
a failure and that his writings have little value for the 
preserit~ough a shift of frame of reference, however, 
·1t is possible to see Bourne and his writings in a d1ffer--
ent light. Bourne's most important wr1 tings deal with 
America's entrance into the war, and these essays have 
generally been studied in 1so1at1on. This gives a highly 
"• 
imperfect view of the man's overall outlook. It is nee-
"-~,~ 
· ·:_:1. essary to study not .just the war articles, but all of 
/ . . 
Bourne's ~portant essays to understand his philosoph-
ical position. A cursory examination of the war essays 
would suggest that Bourne was primarily concerned with·· 
,. 
the relationship of the intellectuals and academicians 
to the war. Consideration of all the essays reveals 
that this was but one aspect of a· broader ·concern. 
" 
Bourne's attitudes were shaped ~y the desire to improve 
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the quality of .human 11i-e and from this basis he wrote· 
. his attacks on those ltho led the country into ware He 
was part1cular1y disturbe~ by the role.the intellectuals 
.. ........ 
chose to play since he felt that they should have been 
J 
most ardently opposed to the war. Having been a follower 
. of John Dewey and an active pragmatist, Bourne's concern· 
, ' 
w~s considerab1y heightened when Dewey openly supported 
' . 
the war. The l-'Tri tings of the two during· 1917 may be -::7j. 
· .,. . · viewed as a de facto dialogue.· In his essays, Bourne 
reviewed in depth the role of the intellectual in society 
and at the same t1me scrutinized Dewey's 1nstrumenta11sm, 
becoming the first pragmatic critic of pragmatism. It 
is in these essays based on a concern for 'the qua1·1 ty of 
human life that one finds the value of Bourne's work for 
the present day. Bourne as a radical can be< .. seen in the 
same ph11osoph1cal·pos1tion that Henry David Thoreau occu-
pied 1n ·the past and the "New Left" occupies today. 
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I. Randolph Bourne: An Introduction 
Randolph Bourne was, during his short life, a rela-
tively minor figure on·the American scene. He was well-
I known only in avant=garde 11 terary circles and in the <·, 
- - \ -
'. 
'"--- . 
____ ---J)rogressive education movemento His writings were ne1--
,:. . .: ' 
' .. ·'.• 
·. ·' . 
:-
' ,·,., . 
ther so numerous nor so excellent ~o gain him a niche in 
- American literature; nor did anything else he did earn 
him:lasting fame. And yet, this man has continued to be 
the object of numerous essays, critiques, and studies 
over the years since his death in 1918. In the two d~a-
ades following his death, many of his friends and aseoci~ 
ates produced brief sketches and essays on the man and 
his work. They wrote primarily because they had found 
Bourne and his ideas to be personally valuable, although 
there were a few w·ho sought to discredit what he had 
written during the war years.1 As time passed, fewer, 
of those who wrote had actually known the man, but there 
seemed the necessity to reconsider and again refut-e what-----
1Host of the W'ork favorable to Bourne done by his eon-
-temporaries took the form of reminiscences o The best of · 
this material came undoubtedly from Van Wyck Brooks who 
included sketches of Bourne in his Emerson and Others (New 
~-- York, 1927) and a far more valuable section in Fenallosa 
and His Circles With other Essa sin Bio rah {New York, VJ .... ~2 o The other materials available appeared as memorium 
of Bourne including g Floyd Dell us '0Rando1ph Bourne, uu 
Ne1A1 Ij.eQublio, XVII ( 1919) s, 276; Alvin Johnson us sketch, 1b1gc 9 · JOtV [1921) j,l 29.3G:l4G and Paul Rosenfeld 8 s Port of ·;. New York (New York 9 1924) cont~ini:ng a sketch reprinted 
:from the Dial, LXXV><{l923). 545-=60; and the later remem--
brances by Lewis Munford: 10Ths Image of Randolph Bourne," 
New Re:eublic 11 LXIV ( 1930) D 151; and Dorothy Tea1lp taBourne into Myth~w=Bookman 9 · LXXV (1932) 9 590-90 The work least 
sympathetic to Bourne -iias produced by Haro1d Laskig "The 
Liberalism of "Randolph Bourne, u FraeJnau, I (1920), 237m8. 
' -
( ~ '. ' 
I • -
\. . 
' . 
,·;·· 
· .... 
\ ... 
·· .. he had written. Few found any serious fault with his 
r-1, 
educational theories or his ideas relating to youth, but 
few found anything of value in the analysis of.the state. 
The most recent writers have continued in this pattern, 
.. 
emphasizing Bourne's analysis of the intellectuals and 
the war and then proceeding to reargue his theories con-
cerning the state, invariably concluding that while the 
essays a.re. interesting,- they a.re erroneous. 2 - . 
I;n view of the conclusions reached by most of those .-..... 
who have wr1tten about Bourne, it would not seem unreason-
able to ask why he should be studied and restudied if he 
. ----. 0 
was indeed (W~_) minor and deluded a figure. Th.e answer to 
'-~.., 
this question rests upon the premise from which one be-
gins. Few who wrote of Bourne were genuinely aware of 
the s1gn1f1can-oe of what. he said, and they consequently 
1et their own · conception of society place an unwarranted 
value judgement upon Bourne's role. Few bothered to 
delve beyond the superficial rejection of his analysis · 
of American government,. 11 The State, 11 preferring rather 
to study his essays as disparate fragments that had little· 
~ 
· real unity. For . an understanding o.f ~the man and his work, 
2see the analysis included in Max Lerner's Ideas for 
the lee Ages: Studies in a Revolu~ionarxmEra (New York, 
1941) 9 in Louis Fillerus ~ando1ph Bourne (Washington, 
D. Ca 9 Col943) £) an0o. 4C,h~rles Go MSridison"Vs Cr+tics and 
Crusadersg A Century of American Prot~st (New York, 
c ~ 1947)-o The m9st recent bookp John Adam Moreau Os 
Rand2lyh Bournes .L~gend and Realit:y (Washington~ D.C •. , ..,. 
c.,1900 9 follows in this same pat-J;,ern as does the unpub-
11shed doctoral dissertation by·--I~ary Eileen Tomkins: -
,,, Randolph Bourne: Majority of One, uo University of Utah, 
.19640 . 
·. . . 
... ~''·.· .. · .... ·.
., 
. . 
.:<' • 
·i, 
... i,, 
. ' 
--
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-
. "'"--
. ' . ' . ' ' . . . 
'I •--o,''"'• \••-","-• 
however, it 1s necessary to first recogni;e the basic 
... _ ... ,, ....... :.,,i .. w,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,, '"' . principles from which he wrote and .t"'hen >to.· proce!ed to 
., 
·v1ew his writings within that context. Under such an 
-~ 
examination certain basic patterns·become visible 1n . 
most of Bourne's writings. Contrary to the presumptions. 
of those who have studied him, ·Bourne's interest was not 
basically political; his radicalism grew from cultural 
rather 0 tha.n political roots. It was his emphasis upon 
· .· ~; · cultural revival, the quality of human life, and ~he 
diversity of- a society of many ethnic strains which made 
his radicalism so different from that of many of his more 
notable contemporaries. This very aspect of,h1s writing 
makes Bourne a troublesome figure for so many of those 
t, 
who have written on him 1n the last few decades. In . 
analyzing Bourne, these writers tend to ignore the cul-
tural roots of Bourne's radicalism and instead compare 
him to radicals who were politically oriented in spite 
of the fact that Bourne's radicalism was essentially cul-
tural. ·What conc-erned Bourne was not -the ·creation of a 
-w1ab1e. .. :~ radical movement or party, but rather the crea-
J tion of a society which emphasized the quality of human 
life. The closest he came to t·h1nk1ng in terms of 
".party" wa·s hi·s conception of a cult of youth capab1e 
of working the changes he sought in ,society. But he can-
not '-be condemned as a failure because he made no effort 
to organize· a movement, for his role, as he himself re-
alized, was· that of an agitator and an analyzer. His 
.· . ' .,... •,•, ·,.. ' . . 
' ' 
' ' 
____ ,L.LL...,,,-
""='"---=-,_,-.... 
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t 
r'';< -~ - •• 1, 
. . 
essay, "The State, 11 easily lends 1 tself to comparison ·; 
-with Henry David Thoreau's 80 0n Civil Disobedience, nu both 
of which emphasize an anarchistic view of the State and 
_societyo Indeed, Bourne 9 s distrust of tne State, his 
dislike for the dehumanizing tendencies of industrial 
society, and his interest in democracy and community 
make him a very real link between the theorizing of 
Thoreau in the nineteenth cent~ry and the present att1-
1:1, .. ' 
'• .... 
tudes of the "New Left." Because :.,his~.;: ~cr1 tics accept 
as valid the basic assumpt1ons·or American society, t~ey ~ 
\.·• Ci~ ·! ,-- ' 
\ "i ~ \.11..i 
·' reach the conclusion that because Bourne chose to stand , !~!::_;:,-_ · 
ap~rt, tO 11 S.Ur6I'8tld8r·'h1S pOWer to influence, II that he must 
be seen as a failure. Bourne, however,. could not have 
accepted such a premise, and indeed recent studies on the 
progr~ssive era such as the work of Samuel Haya ant hi~ 
followers tends to support Bourne over his critics. 
Rather than an oddity or a failure, under close exam1na-
~~on, Bourne must be seen as probably the first American 
wr1·ter of the twentieth century to offer a cr1 ti cal anal-
ysis of industrial society. It will be the ·purpose of 
.. tne following papa~ to provide such a study, placing 
. 
. 
_particular emphasis upon his~ war-time writings which re-
1 
main his most important work. 
·Randolph,. Bourne was a·· deformed humchback who was 
··_·. -• .. part of the Greerltrich Village scene between 1914 and his 
death in 19.18.· . He stood not much over five feet tall, 
with thin.legs and a short, stubby, barrel~like body; 
·./ 
".•· I 
. . 
. . 
L.J_ 
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his head seemed to be unusually large, with heavy uneven 
·features and a distorted earo His appearance resulted 
from a .. difficult birth which had marred the left side of 
his face while spinal tuberculosis 9 contracted at the age 
or four, resulted in double curvature of the spine that 
retarded his grov1th. Sallow complexion and hard, audible 
breathing added to the disagreeable impression he so often 
conveyeq to those ,ha met. Some of his friends remembered 
his eyes and hands as having been the most redeeming . fea-
tures of the man, but Beulah Amidon, with whom Bourne had 
a flirtation, rec·alled in later years that "there was no 
··· ra- ,. ...... - 1 -·~· ,:· • 
.. 
• ' ,"'rl 
, 
( 
I 
\ 
. '' 
,)' ., 
. redeeming feature in his appearance, --even his eyes ha.cf ... · 
no magnetism, --and his hands were clumsy and undistin-
guished. n:3 Those meeting Bourne for the first time were 
invariably taken abac~ and thrown off balance. James 
Oppenheim confessed that he had been filled with repug~·· ·· / ',:/ 
' . ~~·· 
i.--:.; 
nance a.t his first meeting with Bourne wh.ile Ellery ~-·:; ·.'. 
. 
Sedgewick, the.one-time editor of the Atlantic Monthly, 
.. 
wrote that · the man "produced on me something like a 
!:evulsion" whiol1. caused _Sedgewick to be bitterly as.~amed 
4 
of himself. But all who knew Bourne agreed upon one 
3Quoted 1n Brooks, Fenollosa .and His Circle •• _._, p.291. 
Paul· Rosenfeld, hot-tever, ~rrote of Bourne's ''fine musician's 
.hands P 80 and extant photographs seem to indicate that this 
was closer to the truth than statements of ungainly_and 
clumsy handsc Ro~enfeld~ Po 2170 
4Jam.eer Oppenheim 9 an The Story of the Seven Arts," Amer-
ican l~ercuri 9 )CX (1930) ~ X}~i 163; and Ellery Sedgewick, 
The Happy Profession (~oston, 1946), p. 223. · 
'• ,,, I '. 
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point: no matter how ugly and repulsive they found his 
;;,\·· physical appearance to be, his features faded and became 
.. 
' ' .... 
,.· ,,' 
-- . t~ ,. • •: 
t".' ',. ·: 
--~- ,,< '._ .. -: ': ·: ' . 
. r . 
insignificant once he began to talk. He was interested 
1n many things and his conversation flashed from point 
to point, often verging.on the brilliant. ·what he lacked 
1n physical endowments, he made up for with an active and 
precise mind. -.,. 
Bourne came from a m1ddle~class background of typi-
cal Victorian propri.ety. On hie father's side of the 
family were to be found a long line of Congregational 
ministers, including an abolitionist acquaintance of 
-Ralph Waldo Emerson and William Lloyd Garrison, and a 
pastor of the church of Sleepy Hollow, New York. An uncle, 
Colonel William Silliman--from whom Randolph received his 
middle name--had been a Union Army officer, wh~ was killed 
. ,;::"· 
in battle in 1864. On his mother's side the ancestry 
stretched back to include some of the first settlers of 
New England ~nd thence to a long line of lawyers. They 
·were well~to-do ,- ''relentlessly aristocratic," Republican, 
and Presbyterian.5 But Charles BoUrne, Randolph's father, 
•.. 
never managed to live up to the achievements of his or 
his wife I s forebearers. He was a business failure who 
drank too ;much and as a result did not properly support 
his family. Consequently, Charles and his wife, Sarah, 
separated, apparently about 1895, when Sarah 1 s brother, 
5ca.rl Resek, "Introduction," War and the Intellectuals: 
.Essays, 1915-1919, (New York, c.1954J;' p. viii. · ' 
'~. 
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Halsey Barrett, offered to support Sarah and the four 
children on the condition that Charles leave. The two 
agreed and Sarah and the children were moved to her 
. . 
6 
mother's home where the family set up housekeeping. 
It was there that Randolph grew up. He had almost 
a free run of the house since his mother was excessively 
permissive, although his grandmother did act as somewhat 
of a. restraining influence. 7 In thie environment, "hover-
ed over'' by his mother, grandmother, two sisters, and an 
aunt, - Rando1ph' s early ·11ri was .shaped. Childhood and 
youth were for him a time of hopes, desires, alienation, 
and frustration. He wanted to succeed in the physical 
world of' sports and pushed!.lhimself hard to do so, but 
his deformity always interfered. Physical activity was 
111 
there~ore subjugated to a habit of reading and a talent 
for playing the piano, the latter becoming his major 
~ . 
source of. consolation during the years of his youth. As 
he moved into adolescence, Randolph longed· for the social 
life his -contempo~aries enjoyed, but again his deformity 
' 
/ 
As a result he early experienced the feel~ excluded' him. 
1ngs of lone11ness and alienation which he would later 
endure for his ideas. 
... 
• 
' I 
6 The information on Charles Bourne was drawn pr1mar11J 
from Mo.reau, pp.3-~ .• 
7 Christopher Lasch, The New-Radicalism 1n America, 
1889=19·6 : The Intellectual as a Social , e ( l\Jew York, 
19 5 o .. Lasch described the mother as a. -well meaning 
addled womanu · and the father as 88weak, remote, and in-
e:f'f eotual. n · 
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Amidst the problems ot growing up, Randolph's 
thought was being molded by the Gta14 propriety.of middle-
class Victorian life in the small New Jersey town of I 
Bloomfield. Religion, as in most proper homes, played 
an important role in Randolph' e life. Every Sunday b.e 
went with his grandmothe~ and the rest of the family to_ 
services at ·the Old First Presbyterian Church. As in 
many a.nether home of the period, the t~nor of Sunday ·was· 
renected in the fam11y 1 s habits. Beside the conserva-
tive New York Tribune, the family received such magazines 
&B:-Ilb.r-iatian Work, Outlook, and Independent. The ,·books 
in the house were the traditional, "so1id classics"--
Hawthorne, Irving, Thackeray, and Scott--which Randolph 
. 
never really appreciated, and eventual1y ca.me to be criti-
c-al of. Ha managed to learn to read the Bible before he 
began his schooling. 
School for Rando1ph was almost always the same, for 
he rarely found .... -:from~ the beginning in elementary schog]. 
to the professors at Columbia--a teacher who had anything 
vital to say. Nonetheless, he received a good secondary 
• 
education at Bloomf1eld_H1gh which specialized in a college 
prepara·tory course. He was, in genera1, ahead of the 
other members or his class and was a leader academ1ca1ly. r· 
. At times clas·smates became jealous of him but general1y 
he was liked though not always understood. 8 
.· · 
8Mrs. Na.ta.lie Bourne (B'~nninger to Alyse Gregory, 23 
May ·1949, Bourne Manuscripts, Butler Library, Columbia 
. University. ~* 
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Upon graduating from high ·school 1n 1903, Rando1ph 
had intend ad to go right on to· college, having been ac-
cepted by Princetonj but his uncle, who had been support~ 
1ng the Bourne family, felt no obligation to provide the 
money for Randolph's ooliege educetiono Consequently, 
.. he was unable to start college that fall. Instead he 
found 1 t necessary to face the world and earn his own 
living. For the next six years he worked at various Jobs 
including service as a- secretary, a piano roll cutter, 
, 
and a pianist. These were the years that Randolph found 
-to be the most d1ff1ctilt, of ·his life, since he was no. 
- . longer in touch with the life of culture and study which 
he held most dear. During his times of spotty employ-
ment he sought to amend th~e lack to some degree by 
studying the Greek and English classics; and finding them 
not enough, he began to read 1n radical thought, starting 
wi t,h tJie work of Henry George. During these years he 
was far from a radical, or eve~ an intellectual, but 
little more than a young man of many interests in a j' ~ 
society that had no real place for him. The elements o·f 
~__) his intellectualism~and of his later radicalism were 
already present, however. His deformity was without a 
doubt a central influence directing his life. His 
physical disability not only gave him a sense of separ-
,: 
ateness but;' also,,<.in conjunction ,11th his home life, 
· drove him to the life o:r mental rather "than physical en-
deavor. His· disagreeable experience w1 th -the work-a-day · 
. ·--' 
',. -- \ ·.. • '··· , ~-· 
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wor1d contributed to forming hie attitudes. It was not 
until 1909, however, that a new prospect opened for 
Randolph when a friend urged him to apply to Columbia 
I University fora scholarship. The application was sue-
1 . 
cessful and in September 1909 at the age of twenty-three 
he entered upon his college career with advanced standing. 
He had no clear idea of where a college education would 
lead him, but he apparently entertained thoughts of be-
coming a writer or editor. At any rate, college offered 
a better excuse for living than did his efforts in the 
laboring class. 
-I 
Randolph came to Columbia at a most propitious time,) 
for the faculty was then composed of a most distinguished_ 
• 
body of scholars and teache~s including Charles Beard, 
Franz Boas, John Dewey, ~a~d J9:_~~J3 Harvey Robinson. Here 
- ·~,.,-.,-· 
he was able to pursue old interests and develop new ones. 
His course work emphasized first literature then history 
and political science, and finally, by 1919, when he took 
h1s master's degree, had shifted to sociology. But there 
were other clear examples of his interests. During his 
college years, he came as close as he ever would to poli-
tical involvement, for he became a member. of the Inter-
Collegi.ate Socialist League and expanded th~interest in 
socialism which he had shown tenatively before entering 
college. · More important for him, however, were his in- . 
. creasing involvement in literary and cultural pursuits. 
· He became a member of Columbia I s 11 terary society and . 
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acted during his sophomore year as editor of the school 
literary magazine, Colum~ia Montply, as well as dominating 
the discus~ion gatherings of about a dozen students or 
high bro\'T tastes. During his junior year Bourne v_s first 
/\ 
work was published when .an essay written for one of)his 
classes was, at the suggestion or Dean Frederick Wood-
bridge, submitted to Ellery Sedgewick of the Atlantic 
,· 
Monthly. Sedgewick was so well pleased with the work 
that he accepted it and published it. Other articles, 
~ published in various magazines, followed r.ap.19-ly and by / 
')/ . ,' 
a 1913 had been collected in Ybuth and Life published by 
Houghton Mifflin. Despite his literary leanings and his 
entry into the world of writing, Bourne chose to do his ·',·,... . . 
master's work in ~oc1ology for which he received a schol-
I 
arship. This was followed the next year by the Richard 
Watson Bilder Fellowship prov1d-1ng a full year·• s travel 
and study in Eu~ope which he spent gathering ideas, atti-
tudes,and techniques of the young radicals of Europe. 
Upon his return from Europe, Randolph had hoped to 
obtain an editorial position on the staff on the Atlantic 
MonthlI or with the then-forming New Re12ublic, of which 
. ' he had been informed by Walter Lippmann. Through the in-
nuence of Sedgei,1ick and Charles A. Beard, who had ·been 
greatly impressed by his work at Columbia, Bourne managed 
to secure an appointment · as contributing ·ed1 to~,~_9n educa-
I ' tion and religion to the ~ew
7
Republic. The job was, as 
,?.,.-. 
,Bourne said, merely ''ornamental," paying. a rather meager 
. . j 
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salary of one thou,iand. dollars a year with no -guarantee 
that his mater1a1 would be used. ~Ih this position he \..__ 
. . . . t, 
became a specialist on educational reform and won nation-
wide, as .well 'as European, attent_ion- as one of the most 
' adept popular advocates·or the educational theories of 
John Dewey. 
His 11m1 ted fame, however, rested upon more than 
\ 
merely his school reform writings. Of equal if not more 
prominence were his essays on youth of which his first 
published essay had been the beginning. The hopes and 
desires for youth that he developed in these essays were 
closely tied with other aspects of his thought; as well 
as with the developments 1n American society. His· essays 
on youth amounted to nothing less than a call for the 
yoµnger ge:ileration to become the prime forces in a. drive 
for cultural rev1 talizat1on and soc·1a.1 progress. The 
Achievements of' progressivism were not su·fficient to 
satisfy Bourne, but the potentia~ for change, radical 
change, existed in a cult of youth. Reform was not enough 
since it touched only the surface; men remained the same, 
nothing really changed. But a ncult of youth" held the 
p;ossibili ty of basic change in the:::_minds of the people. 
"Youth at its best ·is this constant suscept1b111ty to the 
· new, this constant e~gerness to try ·experiments. 11 9 If 
youth could capture the spirit or a life of change, a 
·life of questioning, there would likewise be hope at 
-- ' 
'Bourne, Youth and Life (Boston, 1913), pp.10-11. 
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reshapi-ng 11f e placing the prope,.r values upon culture 
and.the quality of life in generalo It is apparent that 
that hie emphasis on the fellowship of y~uth )1as but on·e 
, aspect of his desire for a worthwhile 9 humane societ~. 
His emphasis upon commun1ty--both in.sociological and 
psychological (ioe0, the cult of youth) aenses--is one 
of the parallels connecting his thought with that of the.· 
I 
pres'ent "New Left." In both, the character1sj7,ic life 
. ' 
styles and pressures of Ame~ican society are rejected .for 
a sqc1ety 1n which strong inter-per~~~! relationships 
, 
can be ·established. It is not suprising that Bourne 
tur~ed to such. theories when he did, for the divisive and 
fragmenting nature of industrial society was at this time 
becoming apparent to many of his $Ssoc1ates. 
lor·w,x-e Bourne's. cultural theories partic:ularly 
. ~ 
out of step w1th the developments in American·- society. 
The· years in l'Thich he was reaching his 11mi ~ed- prominence 
were ·most hopefuL for the young artists and intellectuals 
of the country, for the United States seemed to be at 
the threshold of an artistic revival that·would make .Ameri-
. •· 
. ' 
. ea the cultural center of the world. The young were 
, ,. . · growing increasingly dissatisfied with the stodginess of 
. American life and were beginning to challenge the old 
traditions, the old customs, the old w~ys o~ life. In 
. I 
, .. ; . 
art, .>poetry,· poli tics--eve:rywhere were signs of a new 
Americao Fre.sh bursts of writing and a ge·neral challeng-
ing -of small-town mentality gave renewed hopes of' the re-
"""' . 
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generation that would sweep the country. · Chicago became 
•I -• 
the center of then11:id,1est literary rebel11onn and many 
of those creative men and women who eventually came to 
~ ·1 
. ' . '-,,./'.'" 
,· 
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· New York got their start there. In the East, ... the ~~ng,··:: 
· · ·. the radicals, the bohemians, the artists--a.1'"1 converg8cf :: :,. 
,;,.:/.:i.i_,... ' 
·on Greenwich Village to create a stronghold and symbol 
of the new, the different, the daring. There were to 
' 
be found members of the new youth such as Floyd Dell, 
Alfred A. Knopf, Louis Untermeyer, John Reed, Mabel Dodge, 
Paul lw~ffllf~:q, and Maxwell Bodenheim, as well as the al-
.. 
\ ' ' 
ready established writers like Lincoln Steffans, Upton 
Sinclair, and Theodore Dreiser. ''Socialism, sex, poetry, 
,1 
~ conversation, dav1n-greeting--anything--so long as 1 t was 
taboo in the Middle West. Just for a few years it lookesi 
as 11' the art1st:1 in America had at la,st got his chance. 1110 
And 1t was in the Village in the midst of the hopes 
and vitality of the creative life that Randolph Bourne 
was to be found. L1lta,:most o:f' those involved in this /. 
brief renaissance, Bourne was "a man interested in more 
impassioned living for himself and others, a man who 
lived through art, a man disgusted with the continual 
frustrations and arridities of American life •••• 1111 He 
. lOoppenheim, ·p. 157. For an expansion upon the cul-
tural· developments during,the years 1910-=1917 see Henry 
F. May's-s. The End of American Innocence: A Study of the 
First, Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917 (New York, c.1959), 
· PPo 219~329 o \_ 
· 
11RoSenfeld, P• 232. , 
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.·was· in m;:iny 111ays typical of the young artiste who had 
fied the middle broti mentality of the small townse Bourne 
" 
had left static Bloomfield to come to Columbia and upon 
his rstul?n from Europe 9 took up residence in the Vil1age. 
I) 
~ ' 
His J[i.etgings soon became "the nucleus of his 01r1n salon"· · ,; · 
.... _.-, 
where his friends and associatesc.2c::tprimarily young radi-
cals .and artists--gathered for comradeship and discus-· 
a1nn_ l2 ""' ... ___ _ 
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II. American Intellectuals and the War ' / 
/-;.As, t;l'l.e .. ·yeiit·.~-1.916. dr.ew ·.to·:.a ·;"clos.e.;st~erti:OI'ltt;:aeem~ to 
· - be going well for Bourne and his associates, for it 
\, 
' ·~ ?" l 
appeared as though the country would reach a new peak 
of cul-tural development. Progressivism was bringing ·:_}; 
about changes,· at a rather slow rate, but it was none-
theless a Qeginning. Society seemed to be .>:; paJ!~ing 
into the con~rol of the young, the dynam_ic, those will-
ing to experiment and to ~-face change. Bu:h for as hope-
ful as tb.e domestic scene appeared, there was,just beyon~ 
' 
the horizons the disturbing prospect . of the European war .• 
While the illlillediate domestic prospects were br1gnt, the 
events in Europe had at another level proven rath~r dis-
.. 
q~ieting. 
The· shock of the war had by no means->· been confined 
,t 
·i:• '\, :I' ,Jl 
" !.- ~ 
.. ~ ..,, 
,. a , 
· to the European continent, for Americans had been as · J 
shaken by the complete collapse of the old stability as ·"~ .· · , . · · 
12Lillian Schlissel, "Introduction," The vlorld of 
~8:ndolph Bourneg An Antqologz {New York, 1965) ,p.xxv .. 
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were the Europeans. The entangling bonds of international· 
trade and industry made a maijor war inconceivable. Con-
,_. 
. ,, 
· viction crumbled rapidly in the face of reality, however, 
and the faith in progress, ci v1l1zation, and man's : · ' 
rationality which had grown over the years was replaced 
by confusion. President Wilson asked that "the United 
Sta.tea be neutral in fact as- t1ell as in name during 
these days that are to try menfs souls,"13 and while 
many--perhaps the majority-~never even attempted to be· 
neutral in thought, there were few who expected their 
country to become involved. To them, this war ,,as a 
European affair being fought over three thousand miles 
away with no American interests at stake. If anything, 
most Americans were glad that the country had been kept 
free of '' entangling alliances. 11 
The shock of the war was intensified by the strength 
·· and 1nnuence· which the peace movement had achieved, 
ironically enough, in the years preceding the outbreak 
of the fighting. In the final years of the nlneteenth 
and the opening years of the twentieth centuries, the 
peace crusade had -grown apace with the colonial1si and 
the" cult. of force'' movem~nts, though on. a much smaller 
scale. · After 1900, the movement gained strength \fi th 
Progressivism, and evidence indicates that peace propo- -
ganda penetrated down to the masses as it had never 
.··· 13AJ.bert Shaw, ed., The Messtjies and Papers of Woodrow W11son (2-vols., New York, 192 , I: 219. . . 
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· done before. ~. The superf'1cial1 ty of the ent1're movement 
i . 
·was indicated, ho111ever, by the s1t1ift collapse of pacifist . 
~ sentiment in Europe when confronted with the emotional 
appeal of nationa.,lism. Even in the United States such ~ 
'• activities were quickly curta_iled as the Carnegie Endow-
ment, which viewed Germany's co~plete defeat as essentia1, 
w1thh~ld· its subsidies from the various peace organiza-\ 
tions.15 When the chips were down, the movement proved 
to be little more than play-acting. 
And just as the peaoe movement had shown 1tsel~ to 
be of little consequence, American neutrality, which was 
from the first a ten~ous thing, slipped gradually away 
to be replaced by 191 7 by a f ersr·ent war-sp1ri t. . There 
was very little conscious realization of this shift on 
the part of the majority of people, for from the begin-
ning, t-he main characteristic of the American response 
to the war was, that of contusion. The average c1 t1zen 
was not alone I) 1n h1s bewilderment, however, since many 
' 
., 
intellectuals found themselves similarly cont)lsed by 
the flow of ·,,events and the improvisations of the Wilson 
,-~ 
,, 
administration. Even tnat se1.ect group of intellectuals 
whose lives centered around the New Republic was beset 
by the perplexities of the situation as they tried des-
perately· to 1mprov1se a foreign policy for the country. --
. 14Merle curi1, The Growth of American Thought (New York, Col943), ppe676-8o 
15eurti, P~ace and War: The American Struggle,lq2§-1926 (Boston, 1959) ,p.229. 
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While most citizens remained ostensibly neutral, 
a·nx1ous to keep out of the war, there were some ·who 
abandoned neutrality almost immediately. Led initially 
'· . 
by the cult-of-force adherentj and the militarists and 
~ . 
aided by the effectiveness of Allied propaganda, the 
pro-Allied forces gained the dominant position by early 
. -~ 
1917. America's scholars were among the first to give~ 
varying degrees of support to the Allied cause. Some,' 
_,,/ 
such as Professor Charles A. Beard, proclaimed their 
' support of the Allies the moment that Germany violated 
20 
. --..... ,,·;:······,~:,._, ____ .,.... 
I .. . 
Belgian neutrality, while others came gradually to take ~ 
sides. Initially, those who favored intervention were 
1n the minority, but by April 1917, nearly all of America's 
liberal scholars had come to favor-intervention. 16 
Academic support for the Allies was to be expected. 
With_ the exception of those academicians who were pro-
German either because of ancestry or by virtue of having 
been educated 1n·Germany, there were few American scho1ars 
who could be expected to be anything but pro-Allied. 
-
The majority of American academics were,during this 
period, primarily-of old American stock, invariably tra~L 
cing their roots--ancestral as well as 1ntellectual--back 
to England. But the situation did not depend solely 
upon nostalgia and tradition, for the allure of England--
and to a lesser exte~t, of France--represented an inter-
16Morton White, Social Thou ht in America: The Revo t 
'5ainst Formalism Boston, c.19 7 ,. p.17 • 
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·, twining of the ideas of reform and d-emocracy which drew · 
. 
the intellectuals into the_ pro-All:ted camp a Just as the 
United States was in the midst of the Progressive move-
ment, England had been thoroughly involved in reformist 
activity before the war. And even though Germany pre-
sented a far better social model than Englan~, she also, 
stood for autocracy and militarism despised by American 
intellectuals. England and France, on the other hand, 
could point to moderate social improvement carried out 
under ostensibly democratic systems. Consequently, Amer~ 
r 1can intellectuals were drawn ever nearer to the Allied 
cause, identifying 1 t with their own 1dea1s and aspir~ 
ations. Thus, most academicians saw the issue as not 
\ 
one of American.interests or neutral rights, but rather 
the confrontation of m111tar1st autocracy versus demo-
17 cratic social reform. 
Much of this thought· stemmed from the academicians' 
involvement in ~rogressivism, Although an exceedingly 
diverse movement of varied groups and goals, there were 
certain characteristics common to most who called them-
selves Progressives. There was, for.instance,- a tendency 
among Progressives to,structure issues in hard-and fast 
" terms of good and evil. This being the case, it was not 
difficult for Germany to become the epitome of military 
f 
autocracy in contras~ to the liberal democracies of Eng-
land and France. Combined with the similarities between 
l7May, P• 366. 
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the part of many academicians to be pro-EnglishD the 1m- r 
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pulse totrards intervention became ever so much stronger. · , 
Furthermore, a major element of Progressivism was an em-
.. 
.. ·pna.sis upon csncrete legislation, the objective being · 
ever to get things done. aonsequently, neutrality was 
east immediately as a negative concept, for it was static; 
it produced nothing definite, nothing-positive. With 
neutrality so early perceived ~s neg~tive, intervention 
had the allure of being a policy designed to achieve re-· 
sults. To all of which must b·e added the note that the 
. prospect for achieving national unity, a result long 
sought· by many Progressives, provided yet another reason 
to support the move towards war. Intervention and war 
for a good cause--for Amer1can1sm--presented the easiest 
, and most appropriate method of carrying this idea to com-
pletion. American entrance into the war in April 1917 
was not then a sudden departure from Progressive ~deol-
ogy, but quite to the contrary, a continuation of th"e · 
-dominant thought of the period. It must.be emphasized, 
however, that mo,st Progressives came to this position 
, sradually between 1914 and 1917. 18 
The decision for intervention was ·not easily arrived 
at, however. The ,pattern of confusion and uncertain 
18 · Information for this paragraph on progressive ideol-
• 
ogy was dral'1n from David Aar.on, lJJen of Good Hope: A Study of 
.Apiericap Progressives (Nel-1 York 9 1951) 9 po245; from Rich-ard Hofstadter9 The· e of Reforms From Br an to FoDoRo (New York, Col955 9 po275; and from William Eo Leuchten-burgf The P.E>rils or_Prosperitz, 1~14-32 (Chica.go, c.1958),, PP• 45-6. 
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shifting of events was clearly portrayed on the pages of \ . 
if 
the New Re2~bli~o Beginning publication·only a few months 
·, 
after the outbreak of the war, the magazine~s editors 
(comprising some of America's .most outstanding pragmatic 
1nt.ellectuals) were immediately confronted by the prob-
lem ·of America's relation to the·,,ar. Initiated as a 
precedent for "mastery" as opposed to "dr1ft 11 th.e New . 
RepubliQ was dedicated to the use of scientific measures 
to solve social problem~, ~nd it rapidly became a con-
necting link between the older pragmatists and the young 
' I 
intellectuals a l9 But the intrusion of the war f oroed 
the ·ed1 tors· to turn away from social problems in search 
of a foreign policy. In their confusion, however, they 
did little more that editorialize that a policy of some 
sort was necessary even though they were unable to pro-
duce an acceptable one. 20 The editors followed a sh1~-
1ng course searching for some realistic position, remain-
ing aloor from absolutism of either pacifism or emotional 
patriotism. In spite of the fact that they were instinc-
tively drawn to the Allies, they sought to have their 
readers analyze the war in regard to 1 ts effec.:t; on Amer- \ 
ica. · The aim ~,as ever to consider events in realistic, 
. ' ''"••. 
pragmatic terms free of abstract principles, .relying only 
c.>n concr.ste goals and purposes. -Consequently, the New,. 
Republict · followed uneasily in the path of vlilson' s watch-· 
tul waiting. But the pro-Allied bias in thJ1r statements 
l9May, P• 317. 
20 
~sch, P• 183. 
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·"' became more and more obvious in the wake or the various 
submarine cr1seso Although the editors tried to seem--· 
....s- . 
~-
or -perhaps actually to be--fair, articles, including work· 
by George Santayana and John Dewey, clearly sympathetic 
to the Allies found their way into the pages of the New 
Republic. 21 r _ 
As America moved towards intervention, tb.e voices· 
·or opposition and di~ssent were rapidly silenced, until, 
-by April 1917, there were few who.were willing to oppose 
• 
· the decision for war. Most of the anti-war sentiment 
originated amons the young intellectuals-who were, it, 
those years, just beginning to experience a sense of 
their own distinctive identity. One of the foremost of 
this group was Randolph Bourne who spol:e out most clearly 
about the war and the role of the intellectual in an Amer-
ica at war. Bourne never wavered in his .opposition to 
the war, although his mentor, John Dew,y, swung to th~ 
support o:f' Wilson and the war effort. As a result,- a 
dialogue of sorts evolved between Bourne and Dewey. 
Waile the latter published in the foremost magazines of 
· the country, Bourne's articles appeared in radic~l J·our-
nals of limited circulation. Since Dewey never repl1_ed 
to these articles, Bourne's ~ritings came as responses 
to Dewey' s>·shifting thought patterns as expressed on the 
pages of the New Repub1ic and other maj,~,):' magazines. 
21charles B.Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism: Crol g We l_ Li uman and the Pro ressive Era 1 00-1 New York, 19 1, po233. 
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l . .. III.· Dewey: A Philosophical Background . ,<-·. 
John De1r1ey was., at this time, undoubtedly the 1eader · 
of' the American.intellectual community and, a~ the same 
time, an integral part of the group of pragmatic intellec~ 
tuals ~rriting for the New Republic. Like Croly, \f eyl, 
Lippmann, and the rest of the magazine staff, he shifted 
_,:_ 
uneasily_ in the confusion or the· neutrality years, a 
situation to -which his background and philosophical de-
velopment could contr-ibute 11 ttle in the way of reassur-
ance. A product of Yankee New England, Dewey had., begun 
.. 
., his rise to prom1nenqe as a ph11osopher in the early 
~:{f) 
t 
years of the century. He had received his bachelor's 
degree. from the University of Vermont in 1·879 and finished 
his doctorate at Johns Hopking five years later. Bettveen 
that time and his arrival at Columbia in 1904, he taught 
at the Universities of Michigan, Minnesota and Chicago. 
Dewey's youth had been devoid of philosophical and artistic 
interests, but small-town life in Vermont undoubtedly had 
a significant impact on the shaping of his philosophical 
statement. 22 By 1914, Dewey was well established as a 
ti } 
philosqpher who placed special emphasis on the creative 
"· 
use of intelligence, finding the best application of his 
II 
philosophy in the educational system. W1 th h1s emphasis 
on intelligence, creativity, and democratic society, the 
4J.. 
war and the problems of neutrality presented an especially 
difficult situation tor him~ As the leader of the intel-
lectual ~ommunity, Dewey o:ff'ers perhaps the best example 
22May, p.147. 
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·.· .. of the uncertainty the war caused many scho1ars. 
At the. ou.tbreak ·of the i'lar, De~1ey 8 s only stat·ement 
regarding war was to.oe found in the book !~hies 9n which 
• .he had. collaborated with James· Tufts of the Univers1 ty 
/I<• 
of Chicago. Like William James before him,· Dewey. pre-
.. ,•:· •._ .... \. 
,,, 
sented his attitude as a.,rejection of the social-Darwin-
· 1st theory of war--as-moral-regeneration and warned that 
"41" 
ti ••• the possession o:f' irresponsible power is always a 
direct temptation to its irresponsible use." 23 James, 
. ~~r 
~\~ 
in a p~mphlet entitled The Moral Equivalent ot Waf, set 
. '· ., •.. [ 
I . 
forth a view parallel to that appearing 1n Ethics, but 
extended his theories to their natural lim1ts .. -pac1f1sm. 
James proposed that a "moral equivalent of,war" be found, 
s~ggesting that youth be conscripted to serve in what· 
amou~ted to a domestic Peace Gorps. Fundamentally, James 
argued for a complete rejection of' war, substituting in-
_stead a pacifism incorpor.ati'ng a plan of dynamic social 
improvement. Dewey, ho,,ever, found 1 t impossible to ac-
cept any such position because pac1~1sm represented to 
him an absolute which would have conflicted with his 
pragmatism. There was no question then that even though 
war must be opposed and disparaged, pacifism coumd not 
be adopted as a realistic alternative • 
.. 
In addition to Dewey's position on war, Ethics 
made clear his philosophical position which had, by 
'• 
· 23 
· ( John Dewey and James Tufts, Ethics (New York, 19~8), 
· · p.482. 
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, · . . · .... ~ . 24 · 1908, evolved beyond thorough-going idealism •. ··.···: .. ~ather·, 
he sought a neutral position o:f improvement upon Germ.an 
idealism anq. British empiricism, absorbing the good points 
-
of each while ignoring other aspects ()of bo~h philosophies. 
·<,J-e 
. With the publication of German Philosophy and Politics 
in,1915, Dewey had come to associate German idealism with 
militarism and had consequently begun to make the phil-
osophioai trans1 tion to Bri ti.sh empiricism which fore-
~hadowed his later political shift to support the Allies 
and American intervention. ·By 1915, 1 however, he viewed 
)'•·• 
~ his choice as lying between two evils and inclined toward 
empiricism as the.least destructive. The view point pre-
sented in German Philoso£hY and ~olitics brought Kant's 
"gospel of moral duty" into question as leading eventually 
to German militarism by presenting a philosophy dev1od 
ot "content" in a situation of practical need, as for 
instance, when a poli ti_cal sj, tuation arose calling for 
universal m111 tary service, Kant's tb.eories were pressed 
into use as the rationale. The philosophical basis laid 
°Qy Kant and filled~~1n by Hegel and finally Bernhardi led 
' 
Germany into the erroneous acceptance of war as a national 
policy. "Philosophical just.1i'1cat1on of war follows·1n-
ev1 tably from a philosophy of :history composed in nation~ 
,'I 
. 25 
alistic terms," concluded Dewey. Nonetheless, i~ ... '.c.r~ 
24For an analysis of Dewey's philosophical position to this point, see Morton vThi te I s The Origin of Dewey's 
. Instr~meptalis~ 9 Columbia Unirersity, Studies in Philoso-ph:y:9 No o 4 ( Ne\v Yorkp 1943) o 
25newey, German Philosophy a~d Poli tic a ( New York, c.1915), p.135. 
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his basic position was not so ·much anti-German· as merely 
· suspicious of the results of German philosophy. He 'trtas 
quite willing to draw what value he could from the German 
experience and apply it to.American life. "We must " 
. . ' 
he wrote, "learn from Germany what method1c and organized 
._work means," but beyollg th.at there was room for sli·epti-
cism. In ~erman Phi,losoI;?hy and Politics Dewey expressed· 
a growing skepticism of the w~rth of ~he German philo-
sophical experience, but a willingness,· nonetheless, to 
view the problem With obnec-t?!vi ty. The shift aw'ay from 
/ 
ideali·sm was, or course, bound up with Dewey's develQp- · 
. •. d .. \ 
1ng pragmatism, for he saw in the acceptance of any abso-
lute--and especially one such as embodied in German phil-
osophy--the danger that it might develop '\mto sGDI8thing 
' #., 
I quite different than had been expected. 
Dewey's neutrality through 1915 and early 1916 was 
-
~ec.st illustrated in his article "on Understanding the 
M1nd of Germany" which appeared in the February 1916 
issue or the ~tlantic Monthly. Aimed at clarifying the 
basis of German thought as contrasted with Allied and 
American thought, the article concluded that one of the 
most substantial differences was the way in which freed.on 
was understood. "There can b.e no disguising the fact 
that our American conception of freedom is 1ncompat1b1e 
with the idea ··c5f· duty that has developed in Germany. 1126 
26newey, "on Understanding the Mind of Germany," Char-
acters and Evepts, I:143; reprinted from the Atlantic Monthly, CXVII {Feb. 1916) • 
I. 
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·. Consequently, he pointed out, th~ German mind 11 1s foreign . 
.,?; 
.to us, n since the G.-ermans explained their.. actions on the 
6 
' grounds of expediency and practical necessity. There-· 
,li1 
tore Allied propaganda---based as it was on moral and 
. - . 
legal absolutes--was tar more compati·'ble with American 
·-
·,. · 
thought than was that of Germany. Although certain ele-
~ents of such a philosophy of expediency and practical-
ity had definite appeal for Dewey and his pragmatist 
followers, 1 t did· ·not go far enough .since goals were in-
" 
variably set by the state, thus reducing the value of 
the entire syste~. Regardless of whether or not Dewey 
,,, 
could be satisfied with German philosophy, ha argued 
that the central point was to understand the workings 
of the German mind. Behind the decision to go to war 
' . 
Iay the desire--1n fact-, the duty--to def·end all those 
"' 
traits of efricienoy, organization, and application of 
I) 
science which marked German life. An~, concluded Dewey,( 
"we must learn to think of the Germans as convinced of ·--
their superior. idealism and universali ti of outlook. 1127 
Objectivity was the keynote in this attempt to bring 
clea..r understanding of the foundations of German thought, 
and on~y near the cot1clusion did Dewey betray any inclin-
ation towards a judgement betw·een .Germany and the Allies. 
-
In that sing1e judgement,- he touched the central point 
of what was 1ater to be the deciding factor in prompting 
most intellectuals to accept 1ntervent1on--democracy. 
, . 
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11W1 th all our defects, 11 wrote Dewey,· 
. ' .... ~ 
is any,measure of technical efficiency, of 
comfortable ease, in a. nsociali~ed· Germany, 11 . 
a compensation for the absence 9 .I do not say 
of political democracy 9 but of the experience 
which comes to men only in a struggle to .be · free and r~sponsible in their moral and social 
a·ctions? 2t> 
•-/ . 
' ~. ....:.:, 
With this lone exception, Dewey's article represented a 
· decidedly balanced and objective analysis aimed not at 
-influencing people to either )side, but rather at under~-~-
standing. 
..-..._ .. ..,. ......... -······.······· 
Dewey I s neutral poei t,i on·· in early 1916 was quite 
clearly reflected in his Creative Intelligence, written 
in that year and published in January of the next. In 
this extended essay, he rejected both British empiricism 
and German 1dea1ism at a time when he was neutral in 
international affairs, for he still opposed entering the 
·war in 1916. Despite hs neutrality, certain indications 
of' things to come appeared in his wr1 tings of that year· •. 
In addition to the hint of a shift in the closing para-: 
graphs of ··.!'on Understanding the l-iind of Germany, 11 the 
·"' 
very nature of his writings changed from the "sweet, 
light, and upl.1:rting ,quality" of Ethics to a hard, down-
to-earth quality with ~eference to the place of power 
and force in politics that was reminiscent of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century theorista. 29 If Dewey was 
... 
not consciously paving the way towards a significant 
28. ~ . , . -
·-:·Ibid., P.147 .. : .... ~ .... ·: · .: :·:i , .f; .f> • • -~ ~ ;• • 
29wfiite, Social Thought ••• , p.163. ~- . 
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· shift, his mind was apparently providing subconsciously 
for what 11,as to come. 
With the debate over ·neutral1.ty growing ever more 
,,:,;, 
.... lively, De\1ey turned h~s attention towarg. the war and 
1 t~ relationship< to intelligence. Consequently, he 
. ~ 
' . 
·round it necessary to clar1~y the dynamics of so'cial · 
. .. . . . . ·/t.. 
chang.e, thus introauc1Iig aa ne,•r i\t:actor into his thought. 
The first appearance in print of these new cons·iderations 
was an article published in the New Repuplic in January 
1916. The purpose of the article, which was entitled 
1,Force, V.iolence:. and Law, 11 was to explain a verbal dis-· 
·tin9tion Dewey felt to be important. He wrote that 
there had been a confusion regarding the words force and 
violence·, and _sought to make the meanings clear. Accord-
ing to Dewey, force carried no positive or negative im-
plications; it was a neutral ,1ord, because "force is 
the only thing in the world which effects anything. 11 30 
Furthermore he statett: 
-
, •• common sense still clings to a via media. 
betw~en the Tolstoian,, to whom all force is vio-
lence and all violence is evil, and that glori-
fication of force which is so easy when war 
. arouses turbulent emotionso o ooForce figures in 
differe11t roleSoo o o ru.nning vlild '[i tJ is called · 
violenceooo~he objection to violence is not 
that it involves the use of force, but that it 
is a waste of force, that it uses force idly 
or destructively.31 · , 
Hence, Dewey gave the word force a very precise and 
9 
technically correct def'1n1 t1on. But'!: to arrive at this 
'- 30newej, "Force, Violence and Law," -Characters and 
Events, II:638; reprinted froei the Hew Republic, V (Jan. 
193b1 
1Ibid., p.637. 
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conclusion, he had to a.pp1y· to the word. a connotation, it . 
did not have in common usage; or, more correctly, remove 
a.11 cOnnotations f'rqm the word ma.kir.ig i~eutralo He 
admitted the existence of this -situation, but argued tor 
... 
a clarification of meanings to get rid of 11 a harmful · 
_/_/ 32 .. 
. , mixtu~e 11;1 .ideas" because ~of mixed langu~ge. ·. . Although 
r""""' 
,I 
people were used to interpreting the· ,rord force from the 
context in which it was used, and generally using it 
with a negative connotation, Dewey .was now saying that 
force was a neutral concept--a means~-and could not be 
judged as negative or positive without first consider-
ing t~ end to l'lhi ch 1 t was exerted. 
/Four ~O:bths later, Dewey reiurned to this verbal 
distinction in another article,. "Force and Coercion," 
this one appearing in the International Journal of 
Ethics. Here he reiterated mo~e clearly his concepti.on 
of' force as morally neu.tral, thereby making 1 t impossible 
1 
·to condemn an act merely because force was involved. In 
fact, "al~ our social questions at bottom concern the 
. ''; 
possession and use of force. n33 Dewey then considered 
the concepts of force, coercion, and violence, where the 
first was.neutral, being necessary for any action or ' ...... . 
activity regardless of whether positive or negative. 
Energy became violence, ,1rote Dewey, only ,1hen 1 t was 
,,. destructive, wasteful, defeating, or frustrating' of it,s . . . ' 
32Ibid 638 . ... . ·: ·· - ' . ' ~ 0 ' , • . . .. .~ . . . • ~ tl ~' • ' ... . . .. 33Dei1ey 9 'Force~ and Coercion, Character,and Events, II:783; reprinted from the National Journal of Ethics, XXVI (April 1916). 
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ot its own ends. Coercion, on the o.ther hand, was merely 
the use of force to make men observe rules and.maintain 
i 
· proper order; In simplest terms, law and vio1ence ,iere 
the two possible expressions of force; i.e. law is the 
. ·'-
• '{ I . 
. 
. 
1ntell1geht or creative use of force while vio1ence is 
,~the unintelligent or destructive use of· forceo Dei1ey 
concluded, the:r;'efore, that "the only question which can· 
· be raised about the justification of force is that of 
comparative efficiency and economy in its use._ •• .the 
.. 
point at issue is concrete utilization or means for ends. n34 
Both of these articles contain a note of marked in-
eongrui ty with the generally _.neutral character of Dewey's 
writings during 1916. Quite without warning, the paci~ 
fists were singled out for special attention. The paci-
fists and those involved in the peace movement were used 
. 
-4-: examples of individuals who consistently misused the 
word force. In Dewey's opinion, they fai1ed primarily 
because of their hostility to force as force, for that 
rendered them an anti-movement incapable of~ positive 
approach to their problems. In 11 Force ,and Coercion," 
Dewey took a left-handed jab at ¢he pacifists with the 
':.: 
remark that "squeamishness about ~orce is the mark not 
. of idealistic but of moonstruck morala. 11 35 Behind this 
.ti 
sudden outburst lay, 'in partt his distrust, or anything 
absolute, and he saw the pacifists as unden1ab1y abso-
t 
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' The appearance of •rForce, Violence and Law" and · .. ,. .. ..·· 
., 
"Force and Coercion" in early 1916 illustrate several 
important.elements of Dewey's thinking at the time. It 
· seems quite obvious that the verbal distinctions intro-
duced were aimed at givirt~ Dewey ~· non,comm!ttal stance 
regarding the war, neither openly advocating intervention 
nor closing off the possibilities of future support for 
. . 
such a policy. This is not to say that he had violated 
his neutrality or thought, for he had not; but he had r 
left the way open to possible acceptance of intervention. I 
• • 
But how valid a philosophical proposition was Del/1ey 's · 
force-violence dichotomy? In actuality, the distinc-
.. 
. tion was nothing more than a manipulation, . a· "verbal 
. . .. •.\ 
trick. 11 36 He was describing every action as involving 
force, .thus generalizing the word to~ point where -it 
. became· practically useless in general discuss~on. In 
other words, force was to be considered only as a .. means 
and the ends had to be taken into account to decide whe-
ther the force was violence. Dewey, himself, lapsed from 
,n. 
1' this distinction bet:ween force and viole~ce in 1917 .when 
. ,; ., 
h, argued against the attack on thought .considered to be 
unpatriotic. He denied "the efficiency of force to re-
move disunion or thought and :reeling." Obviously, a phil-
osopher who wrote that force was the only thing that could 
36Th1s viewpoint and the subsequent development through 
· the balance of the paragraph is derived f'rom ·white,· Social Thoughteo•, pp.164-5. \. 
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-and indeed must be used--to remove disunion. Had he 
been talking within the framework of his force-violence 
~- ·dichotomy, he would have had to ~,rite, not force, but 
violence in this insta11ce. The suggestion is that_; Dewey I s 
verbal distinction was a 11 trumoed-uo11 affair. As a 
... -
further illustration of this proposi·tion, one may observe 
that the years immediately following 1916 were the only 
ones in which he bothered to.:--1nainta.1n this pos1 tion. He 
bad ~ertainly dropped the distinction by 1939·twhen, as 
a'peaceful Socialist opposing the Communists then urging 
the use of force, he wrote of removing every possible 
( 
"conflict ,vhich arises ••• out of the atmosphere and medium 
of force, of violence as. a· ;means of settlement ••• 11 -
Clearly, :force and violence were used interc·hangeably 
here and the dichotomy of 1916 had vanished.· 
What then lay behind the development of this "verbal 
trick?" The answer appears in one of the final sentences 
' J 
of II Force, Violence and Law": 
Unless war can be shown to be the most eco-
. nomical method o:r securing the results which 
are desirable v1i th a minimun of undesirable 
results, it marks waste and loss: it must pe 
adjudged a violence 9 not a use of forceo37 
Obviously~ to the pragmatist, the inte111gent individual 
pat reserve t~e right to decide whether a war will be 
an ·1ntell1gent or destructive use of force, for if the 
desirable results outweigh the undesirable ones, then it 
• I 
~·i~.~. I ·~ 
. · _. \, 37newey, "Force, Violence and Law, 11 p. 640. 
, If, .' 
I \·' • ,; ."~' 
·, .'! ', 
\~; ' . ' 
.' ,' . ' 
"' ' 
., 
\ 
(-" -
~ ' - . 
' ' 
35 
r· .... 
•. ·;: 
'-.·~:·<: 
""1,, 
I 
.. 
I 
I 
·r 
' ·. 
, I 
•·· .,,· • ,. , ..• , . .__.,.' , ~·-•.•«,,;,·,,.,.-.~"'''"'·""'-'-\ -~ ·-•~ .,··: ~,, - , ·. - ' ·J·c • - .- ' ';" •• 
· · · .. · becomes acceptable to support the war. Hence; 11' the 
.... 
war ie not a violence, 1 .• e. not a waste of force, it- shou1d 
be supported. Consequently, the verbal distinction pro-~ 
·~ 
· · v1ded Den,rey with a comp.letely acceptable philosophical 
basis for supporting Amer~can intervention. He was not -
-
immediately committing himself as to the 1ntel1igence of 
the war, but "he was providing himself 111 th a. reason for 
·not 1n~tantly ruling it out as incompatible with the . .! 
f sp1r1 t of creative intelligence. u38 
. i' 
It may be unfa~r to accuse Dewey of "trumping-up" 
his verbal distinction as a rat1ona11zat1on for his shift-J 
. 1ng attitudes, for he may l"tell have developed this dichot-
omy. a.s a legitimate philosophical investigation and"; later 
discovered it to be unworkable. On the other hand, the 
sudden appearance and use of this distinct~on readily 
suggest a rationalization. Perhaps Dewey's verbal dis-
tinctions were not aimed at easing him toward an accep-
tance of war, but the war must certainly have had a cat-
alytic influence in bringing this particular problem to 
his mind @,t that particular time. C:ertainly his prag-
matism must have forced him to reject pacifism as an 
,Oa 
Q 
-
unrealistic absolute just as he rejected the emot1ona1ism 
o~ the super-patriots. As the leader of the pragmatic 
' intellectuals, Dewey undoubtedly. intended to be alert to 
·~' 
· _,~;- the possibility of American participation in the war and 
the even mo.re significant poasib111 ty that the war could. 
38wh1 te, Social Th.o:!:1£iht ... , p.162. 
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be turned to useful -end-s. 
rv.. D'.ewey and the Problem of the War . · r, 
\ 
. 
. As 1916 ·ended and 1917 began, American neutrality 
· - beoarire- more precarious. Already the country was well 
· advanced. on a program of preparedness which had the poten-
tial of edging it into war at any tim~. Amidst ~he shift-
ing of American attitudes, Dewey had managed to hold to 
his neutrality. Not so another academician who occupied / 
a position of much greater prestige and power in the 
"' 
·.· · · · · - · · · · country--President tfilson. The professor in the li'hi te l 
.. ( 
·, .. · 
,· 
House had presided over the various policy changes·s1nce · 
1914, searching tor a useable program with which to con-
fron~ the European wa.r •. Initially he conceived the United 
States role in the World War as one of mediator, ready to 
serve, to bring peace, standing aloof and maintaining 
absolute "self-mastery." His pre-1917 policy followed 
the logic.of two conflicting aims, ror he wanted the 
United States to remain the "Great Neutral," maintaining 
sane and just peace-time values Jnd, at the same time, 
he felt it imperative that the Allies defeat Germany. 
Wilson never really meant "Peace t1i thout victory, 11 but 
. 
sought instead a victory followed by an.unvictorious · 
peace.39 From the beginning, he had, like nearly every-
one else, disr·egarded his own plea for neutrality in 
thought and deed and exhibited a decidedly pro-Allied 
l, 
39Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men \iho I-iade· It. {New ·York, c.19481, p.272. • 
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bias, for he was an Anglophile who thoroughly admired the -• ~ ·· .... 
'· 
_parliamentary system of Bri ta1·no FurthEfrmoi~e 9 he was - --------",··-------~ 
. . 
.. 
J.ntellectua~lly drawn to the Br1t1sh thinkers~. conservatives .. · 
. , I • ,! . 
· - and Manchesterians su~h as Burke, Cobden 9 Gladstone, and 
Brighto. His devotion to things British left very little 
, 
room ·for an unbiased view of CEerman life and culture. 
... 
,;) 
And if Wilson's- personal bias was· not sufficient to under-
,. 
· mine American neutrality, the even stronger anglophilic 
. . 
prejudices of those who surrounded him _in high govern-
' 
ment circles were more than sufficient to put neutrality 
' 
· on shaky ground. Consequently~ there·was a marked degree 
or imbalance between the1 President's dealings with Germany 
and·~_·,those with the Allies. In dealing with England, 
.. ,; 
Wilson made expediency the basic cdns1deration, but be-
cause human rights were involved in relations with Germany, 
. . 
I 
I. 
• 
\ 
; ) . ' . 
_;,. - . 
. ' '! ., 
.. 
.. 
\ -
. 
·polic·y .was governed by '!an extremely forward defense of 
technical rights~ 1140 
As the war dragged on, Wilson became increasingly 
-fearful of a German yictory; and as this· feeling grew, 
neutraiity became more and more of a pretense. The Pre:B-
. . . 
ident moved ever closer to. a Id>11cy of throwing the United 
-
St~tes · 1nto the- w~r to tip the balance of PO':Ter enough 
~ 
to enable the Al1ies to defeat·Germany. In spite of the 
• .. ... 
annoyances that Allied policies caused Wilson, especially. 
1n·the months immediately preceding the American declar-
" 
· · .. ·. . . atiozr:ciof war, 1 t is unl1ke1y that he ever would -have taken , 
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· ·. serious effective action against· the Allies. Germany 
remained the real threat. ·Desp1 te the extreme peace 
emphasis of the 1916 presidential campaign and the prom~ 
,.., . 
inence o.f the slogan 11 he kept us out of the 1r1ar," Wilson's 
request for a declaration of war on the night of the sec-......... -t 
ond of April came as no great suprise. In the days be-
tween the election and the inauguration, the American 
people became psychologically adjusted to intervent1o·n° 
in. a war they had re-elected Wilson to keep them out of. 
Nearly all the forces of American life, ~eluding the 
top leadership, the intellectuals, the propaganda, had 
.been directed toward intervention. 
The United States, however, could not go to war tor 
merely mundane or practical reasons. Certainly inter-
\ vention could be based upon semeth1ng far more signifi-
cant. What was needed was a :faith to fight for, and the . , 
need was neatly answered by the Allied :gropag~nda model--
the country would fight for democracy, for rig~t, for 
justice, and for mankind. "The mission of America 1n 
the world is essentially a mission of peace and good 
41 · will among men. 11 Speaking with the piety and _ se1i.:. 
righteousness so characteristic of his Presbyterianism, 
Wilson employed exceedingly idealistic rhetoric when he 
~
1Th1s statement 1s taken from Wilson's addres~,before the Manhattan Club,- New York, on 4 November, 1915, con-
. tained in Ray Stannard Baker and William Eo Dodd, eds., The Public Pa;eem of Woodrow Wilsong The New Democrac~t 
:Presidential Messa~ A~dresses 2 and Other Papers C . vols., New York, 192 , II:386. 
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addr.essed Congress. on that ra1ny night of April second: 
. 
The world must be made safe for democracy / ••• Jf e have no selfish ends to serveo 1·1e de= 
· sire no conquestf,\no dominiono vie seek no in-demnities tor ourselves 9 no material compen~ 
. sation for the sacrifices we freely makeo42 
··-.In effect, Wilson wanted an internationalization of Pro-
. ' gressi vism; · ~ crusade for reform and for democratic in-,,. . 
..i......:.... 
. · stitutions extended to the irorld scene. Despite the 
·difficulties incurred in such activities at home'· the 
President strove to carry Progressivism to an impossible 
extreme~3 And. in ··so doing, he endangered the very prin-
-~ 
·.j 
.- ciples .for which the war had been proclaimed by permitting 
the super-patriots a free hand tri thin the country. 
American intervention brought an end to the con-
~, 
fusion and uncertainty with which many intellectuals had 
lived during the previous fe,-1 years. This was indeed 
the case in the offices of the New Republic where the 
decision r~ war was hailed 'as a major triumph.for the 
President. Th_e editors, expressing their new fotlnd re-
s·olution in an editorial entitled "Who Willed American. 
Part1oipation? 11 tried to clarify the close-re1at1onship 
~ 
which they felt existed between ac-t·1on -and 1dea,s; 1.e. 
the high degree of i_nvolvement o:r intellectual consider-
I at1onD, in the decision for interve11tion. The editors 
. 
. 
apparently found great consolation in their claim that t 
the intellectuals had all along been in the forefront of 
42Taken from w1ason's request for a declaration of war 
on4Germany 9 Shaw, p.38 •. 3Hofstadter, The Age of Refqrm, p.279. 
I'', ' I .• ~ 
.... '.' 
. ' 
' ' I 
I • • 
. I 
'I ':::, IE! 
''. le 
4o 
•. 
- ~· 
• 
r• , 
. : . ~ 
. ·' 
. . . . . . ' . . . ' . 
.. 
' ' 
-·-··- -· - -- ---=-~ 
---- -- -- ~ 
... '.-
. 
. · the ·movement t''?ward American intervention, al t~ough this 
.determination had natl always been c1early revealed op. the _ 
· pages of the Nair, Re-oublioo The dec1aration of war ·\fas 
W1lson 8 s 88personal triumph," but ·1t was also declared a 
triumph or ideas over the mere1y necessary ...... "But the 
American people, 11 wrote the editors, 
were not forced. into the war either by fears 
or hopes or previously recognized obligations .• ···-·T~ On the contrary9 the ponderable a.,nd tangible .·.,_ · ··1, .• ,,~:·· 
rea1i t:tes of the immediate situation counseled 
neutrali t~o o o For the first time in hi story · ·, 
a wholly independent nation has entered a great and costly war under the influence o:t ,. ideas rather than imn1edis,,te interests o o oft-4 9i 
.. ),,, 
.•-. ,I 
. ;.;." 
If the New Repuplic intellectua1s were ,1illing to 
-... 
admit that the Situation favored neutrality rather than 
'('::-,\ 
......... intervention, on what grounds could they base their ac-
ceptance of Americ-an entrance into the war? .The,- answer 
r 
. -~ lay in the o tral element of their thought-pragmatism. 
,, 
Pragmatism had lways been a· signifi.oant factor shaping 
their suggestions regarding the use of creative 1ntell1~ 
. gence to shape events rather than permitting events to 
con~rol the. development of situations. Consequently, 
in order to achieve some creative results from the war, 
. - ..>' .... 
. . the ed.i tors sought to apply in war-time the peace-time 
f 
. lessons of pragma.tiEtm• They viewed the war as- an oppor-
tun·i ty to create an international peace-keeping organ1 .. 
zat1on abroad and to more effective~y employ governmental 
. apparatus for reform at, home. .&e President 1 s moral /~ 
/ 
44uvwho Willed American Participati~on'l," N~w :ij.epublic, X (April, 1917), 3.08~9. ~ . 
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~rusade for democracy and humanity had given the 1ntel-
lectuals the appropri~te basis for accepting and support- · 
ing intervention. They could go to_war, secure in the 
thought that ev,enta could be turned to creative purposes 
--..,. ... fl 
through the application of their collective ·1ntelligenoe. · 
. . •' 
United .. 1_State:s entry into the .w~r. p:t_"t~~ented the ma_ster 
"• l 
• r 
~;t,:~"CI"eat1V~01nt8i11gence ~it~J,;i difficult problem, for in 
. Ji 
spite of the door Dewey had ieft open in his 1916 writings, 
'''"'-"''~ \\~ 
. "~· ~-
. ', -
-~-· .. --• -- .. _ .. ~ 
he .was far from certain· as to how he should handle the-~ 
·war situation. The uncertainty that he fe1t was discussed 
in gloomy terms in an article anti tled "In a Tim~ .. of · 
- ·' ' 
.. 
National Hesitation" which appeared in the §even Arts 
"':" 
magazine in May, 1917. The essay, written prior to the 
-declaration of war, showed none of the resolution and 
,-- certitude that dominated Wilson's speec~'-8 and the pages 
of the New Republic. Dewey had anticipated the declar-
ation or war, but wrote that this would be .but a partial 
solution for America's hesitation.· Far too astute to 
,· 
• be taken in by the prop~ganda of the Allies, Dew~y de .. 
~·· clared "that· not -until the almost impossible happens,· 
not-until the Allies are fighting on our terms for our 
democracy and civilization, will [America's hesi ta.tion 
· be endecfil. 11 45 ·· Corr';ct in his analysis of announdad war , 
I 
aims, Dewey nonetheless misread the situation completely 
• 
.', j ·.· in his prediction that the national hesitation would 
45Dewey, "In a Time of National Hesitation, 11 Seven Arts, II (Ma1-_, .. ~917), p. 6; reprini;,ed in Characters and Events, ,. II: ~.l-F3~g • • · . 
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remain 1n spite of the decision to enter the war, for , 
Wilson 9 s moral cru.sade s,arept a,vay any doubts in the minds 
, 
of -most Ameri.cans.o De,iey he.,d. made . the mistake of under-., 
.;'',:, I• 
. . \. 
/ 
• 
estimating the vtarc=time emotions o:r a pet.>ple driven to 
(~,{ r 
e_xtremes of ·patriotism by its governmento 
' 
lJ L....a 
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It was natural enough that Dei1ey, as a pragmatist, 
. l... . . . . . . 
'tY,1 ,1] i~ i,' j 1 •; 1/ I l..', 1.• 1 ";; Ii•,·, ' • , ·, • .. • ' ' ti 
should be hesitant about the war and its imnlications. 
. -
It· was almost as· natural that he I should eventually come 
to support the. role ~111son had cliosen for the United 
St,ates. "Watchful-waitingn had never been the ~jlilosopher's · 
. f\ 
~-I . . 
. ideal, just as most Americans found the suspens~\ of neu--
trali ty quite a bit less than appealing. Dewey was--
. unl'ike most philosophers--an activist who found little, ot 
".:..~~~i'-..,.1 ·· .... ~;'-
interest in the oontemplat1ve life. His own brand of 
pragmatism, aptly called 1nstrumenta11sm, was directed 
at the practical rather than the metaphysical; directed 
ever to,iards action. Consequently, w1 t·h the appro.ach 
of United States intervention, De,1ey tried to show the 
compatibility of pragmatism and the wa~, continuing, how-
ever, to reject the extreme war-as-regeneration views of 
the social Darwinists. His philosophical wanderings 
. ,, 
had brought the conviction that war might, at times, 
be inevitable and in such situations had to be <faced 
,-; 
-;/ 
· :! . and turned to some constructive end. He sought to exp1a1n 
• I 
: r 
.. r 
.. ·. .·;'. . 
t...... ;~,. ·:·,:;: .. (-'' ·~ -,.. /t 
....... : ,'· 
that in these instances·, the use _of· nt111 tary methods in 
. . ,,.-\::·,'1> !.''\ 
I . ',j 
international relations might become· necessary,, -m~king war 
~{,} 
:~ 
, 
a pragmatic means to the pra-ctical _end· of peace through 
" 
\ , . 
' .. # 
,, 
,.'I' •. , 
' --~ ' 
: ..... ' . 
~· 
,", 
, .. 
·- ,.. -
.l...J_ 
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\ ., 
', 
a world order or league of peace. As early as jipril 1916, 
f 
Dewey p.ad st1ggested calling a conf erenca of nations 9 
'· 
_ pointing to this as a 0011st:rllctive use of intelligence 
rather than submitting to a defensive waro 46 Consistent 
with his earlier opinion, Dewey never departed from his. 
objectivity regarding·the combatants and consequently 
never
1 
sank to· the 1evel of jingoistic denunciation of 
'· 
. 
. 
the German mind employed by some intellectuals. Within 
his own frame of reference, he maintained his neutrality 
from the first. His acceptance of the war was in no 
•' 
sense~ siding with the Allies, but rather an attempt to 
turn the war to pract1cal·democr.at1c uses--most specifi-
cally an international organization. Bound up in these 
shifts of philosophy was Dewey•~ feeling that democracy 
_"' and science are invariably tied together to ensure the 
progress of mankind, while the dynastic state--such as 
Germany..--wa,s incompatible wi th-:,.science, thereby detracting 
from progress. 47 
- .. 
Dewey's hesitation was shortlived, however, for; ~ 
... -
as he had written earlier, "nothing·is so paralyzing 1n . •' 
. 
~ 
actinh as prolonged doubt as to.,.:.t·he justice of ones 
ca.us~. 1148 With Wilson I s call to the cruSade, Dewey fell 
into line with the New Republi,·C liberals ,,ho were busily 
converting their magazine into the rallying point of the 
46Deweyp "Progress," International Journal of Ethics, 
~I. (April, 1916) 9 ---~F ~ 311=22; reprinted in Characters a.ni Events~ Ilg 8~~30. -~---
478Wh1 te~ ~oc:\_al '.!:nought, .. .,., 9pol~8., ~ Dewey, On Understandingo11>0, I:.L3l. 
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pro-war, moral-crusade intellectu.Ji·s~·: .. · The.::'.pr.oolaimed • 1 ' ,_·.,,'·1 ·, l·l'.I . 
war goals of. making the world safe for democracy and . . i· ..•. 
· · ·
7
>· · · . c1v1112Jation lured many hesi ta.nt pragmatic intellectuals 
-.:·· •. ,.J--•• • .. · .• " 
.. 
... 
.. •\ .·· ... ·
\ 
.. 
. . 
· {: .. 1:tl:to the pr9-war campo Seeing dramatic possibilities 
:for democratic elements throughout the ivorld, De,"1ey 
followed the swing ~o support·the war. He began the 
..... 
~ 
elaboration of his new attitudes in three articles pub-
lished in the Ne~~Republic in mid~l917 in which two 
· ~sic ideas prevailed.· The fir~t, the emot1.onalism .. &\nt\t, ... 
failur-e of the pacifists, was»· emphasized in 11 0onscience , 
'!;,-
and Compulsion" and 11 The Git.tture of' Pacifism, 98 while the 
second, the social possibilities of the war·, received 
the greater attentio:t;1 in "What America·:·, Will Fight For.!!:: 
While 1t may at first eeem·strange tha.~ he slngled out 
. 
~. 
such an insignificant group, the explanation lies in the 
absolut1stic nature of pacifism. Dewey saw them as mis-
/ . 
,/ . 
g~ided or perhaps incapable of seeing the creative pos-
sibilities of the war. Their programs were, as Dewey 
pad stattd more than a year before, negative and self-
defeat·1ng. · 1He1r o:pposi tion to the war was futile 
and uncreative. Rather, t,hey should have been working 
to turn the war to advantages in order to create a world 
league for peace as Dewey felt he was doing. He called 
. upon the pitcifists to give up their obstructionism and ti . 
~ 
use their innuence to shape the goals. Th~ war, he 
wrote, "gives an immense ppportunity for reorganization, 
· an opportunity which just~fies the risk.' ·~49 Continu1n"g 
49Dewey, "On Understanding •• , 11 II :360. 
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in this vein, De,1ey presented his rationale for support-
ing the war in 19lrlha.,t America Vlill Fight For":·, 
. , 
A task has to be accomplished to abate an international nuisance, but in the accom-plishing there is the prospect of a world 
· organization and the beginnings of a public 
· control which crosses nationalisticaboun-daries and interestso It is not,· in my . op:tnion9. fair to sa,y that these aims are mere idealistic glesses 9 sugar-=coatings of the · bitter pill of waro They present genuine .pos-sibilities, objects of a fair.adventureo50 
With this article, published in August 1917 ,. Dewey made 
;·_. ·.· : 
..... . clear his ~pro-,1ar position and berated the pacifists for .) ~ ;. 
t,J;l.eir negativism. He return_ed to the theme of the social 
possibilities of war nearly a, year later with "What Ar'8 
.. 
We Fighting For?'' in 11hich he enumeraiied a number of . 
. ~ potentially creative ,1results which _the war ·could bring· 
about, the most important of which was the ·approach of 
~' 
9 
•tan international state. 11 51 The article demonstrated 
) 
both Dewey's deep conviction on these _points and, at 
J 
. the same time, the idealistic and unrealistic nature of • 
his thought in this regard. }lo longer was there need, 
11' Dewey' S\mind, tor action to '.(be:i paralyzed by doubt and 
hesitation. 
. i 
. Dewey had barely begun his own atts..bk upon the pao1~ 
"' fists who refused to support the war. when he found hims.elf 
• 
I 
• 
-in the awkward pos1·t1on of having to defend their ri~t 
~ . ) 
50newey, 11What America Will Fight For," New' Republic, XII .{Aug_ol917), 69; reprinted in Charac;tJar.s ··and Events., II§ 561-5 o 
· 
' 
/ 
-~. 
1; , 
_lDe-v1ey 9 '°What Are vle Fighting For?tro ,Indepandent~Jt:.OIV 
1
. {June 1918) 9 4749 480c=3; reprinted in Cha~racters and Events, · 
.. II: 55·1~60, under the title, 11 The Sooial Foss1b111t1es 
. of -Vlar$ 11 
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to dissent. By the end of August of 1917, the absolutists· 
on the other side of the speotrum.~-the super~patriots--
had already gone far to change the war from a moral cr.u-
sade to a bigoted rampage. Dewey was forced thereafter . 
to turn on several occasions to the problems created by 
· the w~r spirit and the ever narrowi~g pOli tical spectrum 
in the United States. Beginning with an article entit1ed 
"Conscription of Thoughttt. in -~the first of September issue 
of the ·New .'f1.epublic, he·argued for a tolerance of dissent, 
an openness of discussion,~ and a general rejection of 
;oercion to enforce conformity. There was a hint in the 
,,. . 
article that his main point was to draw attention from ):, 
the pacifists by ignoring them. Undoubtedly, however, 
the increasing bigotry and the suppression of dissent were 
having their effect on the philosopher. Dewey returned 
to the subject again· in NovemberJ,l~l7 in a New Republic 
. 
. 
article entitl'ed "In Explanation of Our Lapse,•!52 In 
.this essay he confron~ed ~ the rising · bigotry and super-
.·. patriotism and called on the liberals to oppose it, but 
saw in the situation merely the.unfamiliarity of Americans 
with the ways and uses of war. The optimism evident in 
" 11 In Explanation of our L~pse"was gone a year later, how_; 
ever, when he wrote :1..r1 11The Cult of Irrationality. u In-
deed, Dewey's earliercoptimism had turned to suprise at 
the emotional and illiberal rampage gr.owing out of the 
. war. By·t~e tiar's end, Dewey must certainly have re-
52The article appeared in the New Republic, XIII (Nov. 1917),17-8; reprinted in Characters and Events, _II:571-5. 
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· g~ined many o:f' the doubts and ·hesitations he had kno\'rn 
in the early days of American participat1ono ,Five years 
later, Dewey was ~dmitting his error of having fallen 
victim to '°an illusion of ·real unity" among the Allied· 
53 
nations during th.e ware 
"· 
In the years prior to American intervention,. Dewey's 
·thought had undergone a s~ries of gradual changes which 
' ' permitted him to_ support the American war effort once 
the United States entered the war. For a philosopher~ 
\..--
of Dewey's sort, · the shift was most dramatic. The strain-
... . 
. 
ed logic of the force-violence dichotomy, the harsh words 
'j ' for the pacifists, and the refUsal to immediately em-
~=, brace either a pro.-or anti-war position were al'!' to be 
expected from a::_pragmatist. Dei1ey 1 s shifts were not en-
gendered by a naive patriotism or national pride any more 
than they were by a concern for the American economic 
system. Uppermost in the philosopher's mind was.undoubt-
edly_ ·a concern for the creation of a league capable of 
keeping peace in the world. With this as a goal, the 
only question remaining to Dewey was how best to serve 
• 
53Dewey; 11Why Not outlaw War?, 11 Characters and Events·, t 
II.:667; reprinted from the New Republig, XXXIV (March 1923), 
89-911·1here it was publish~d~;under the title "Political 
Combination or Legal Oooperation? 1~ -Ev~p Dewey tt s attitude 
toward pacifists had changed rather radically ~· ,1ell, 
.· ~.or in the same year 9 h~ wroteg. "vlhen war is a crime by 
· ·.·. \ t ~~4,1 ,_the la\1 of nationso o o the. 't"tarlike people ,,111 then be the 
->,../.;·:~.,.·-.,,·:·"nonc:>patriotic and the criminalso -. The pacifist then be-
:\)··,.,~- . comes the active pauriotcoloyal citizen, instead of an 
/.:- objector a nuisance and a menace. or a passive obstruc-· 
ti oni st o ~ 01 If War Were Outlawed, iii Cha~ct era anq .Events, , I f· , ' 
,·, . . :-·.~ ·' ' 
·11: 672~6; reprinted from the New Rapub11c, XXXIV [April 
1923) 9 234cs5.- . 
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that end. American intervention forced Dewey to decide 
whether to support the use o~ war ~s a means to achieve 
world order o Cast in· this light, the -\tar seemed a justi-
fiable expedient if from it 'Should issue a league of na-
,M 
tions that would prevent future wars. Dewey, having set 
his mind. upon . ·such an institution oouihd not then be over-
ly bothered by the question of theneoessi ty of United .. 
States entrance into the war since that was already a 
. tact. Debate on the quest~·:on would be academic and fu .. 
-
.. -
tile.: ~t worst, however, Dewey ca.n be ~caused of naivete · 
•, 
; .; in failing to realize the. domestic result of the war ef-
. ' 
. fort. 
With Dewey's defection to the pro-war ranks, nea~ly 
· all of America's liberal scholars and intellectuals had 
~ome to support the war effort. The ant1-war and paci~ 
fist ideas of pre-1914 had been abandoned to whatever 
radicals were w1111ng to accept them. There remained, 
-however, a small group of young intellectuals who had . 
not been ·sedua,ed by the ·Allied propaganda or the quas1-
··relig1.ous crusade of the President or by the dynamics 
~ of their own phi1osoph1es. Clustered about the sma11· 
_,,,,,I 
-literary magazine,, the Seven Arts, just as the war l1Q- · 
erals clustered about the.New Re_publicA a handful of 
. . · · 54 radicals continued to man the anti~war positiono Many 4 . . . ' . . 5 Tb.e Seven Arts h~d its beginnings as an idea concocted by ~mes Oppenheim, ,1ho sought to bring about 0 via a mag-
azine, an idealistic regenaration of American life with 
·the artist at the he~d of societyo He recruited W,aldo ~ Frank and Paul Rosenfeld 9 with $50~000 in funds secured 
• 
.. 
,/ 
/ 
from l:4reo Ann.ette Rankinv.~1rrho sold her collection of . 
. ~:..:.. . · ....·· ,,· ' . Whistler pa1n~1ngs for the purpose, established the maga- · 1r'< · -
• 
.. / 
/-. ' 
I> 
,, 
' . 
•· 
. I 
... ,,J.L _J ~ ,...,....~ .... -
.·..: 
" 
· of the members of this group were pragmatists who had 
been rollowers of John Deweyo They had expected the 
\ philosopher to refrain from any support of the 1r1arv be-
" 
cause his philosophy had stressed constantly the peace-
f\tl and 1.ntelligent approach to the solution of problems. 
Foremost amor,.glthe radical young pragmatists was Randolph 
s. Bourne, destined to be Dewey's ~Ost pierci11.g critic 
··. and,·. at the same time, the· most c:tu.t·standing critic ot the~ 
• I 
war •. 
...... 
. V:~ Bourne, the War, and the Intellectuals 
The main body of Bourne 1 s·war·writings consisted 
. . 
of a series of. five articles published~.~over a five month 
~ 
period in the s·even Arts magazine, beginning w1 th "War 
and the Intelle·ctualso 19 5.5 The article, a· sarcastic attack 
.. th~ 
onlacademic community, ca.me in response to Professor 
z1ne with· tb.e understanding that the e·a.1 tor1al -department be entirely tree of re.str:tctionso The magazine became by 
mid~l917 the organ of the anti~war faction 9 containing in the April iasue 11 a suppleme111t entitled n.Ameriean Indepen-
\ . 
dence and the \faro 88 
. . 'j, 55The five articles t1ere 00 The tlar and the Intellectuals," Seven ~ts* II (1917) 9 133-46; "Balow the Ba.ttlep 11 ibido, 
. ppo270c:a7; The Collapse of .American Strategy, 88 ib~do 9 _ 
·PPo409=24; . va.A War Diary $7 an ipido 9 PPo535~47; and "T-tvi- ,-_.> light o~ Idols 9 n 1bido 9 688c=702o All of these articles have been reprin~ed as will be indicated in the following 
:footnoteso Bour~e had Wl"'itten two pamphlets for the American Association for International Conciliation in 1913 and 1914g Arbitration and International Politics ( fublic~=~ion Noo 70~ NeinJ' York 9 1913) and Th~ Tr,E:di t~~·q;q 
of War (Publication Noc,. 79~ Ne1r1 York9 1914) o In both pamph1ets 0 he vieifed 1r1ar as an anachronism and 9 una11\1are of the impending holocaust 1 looked to arbitration and international law as a means of ensuring peaceo In 1916, he compiled and edi tad a series of peace ·proposals for · the Associationg To~1ard~_an End:tJ.r:1;~6.p Peaceoo=o (New York, 1916) o This iiork undoubtedly helped orystalli"ze his total oppositlon to the war. 
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~ De-vrey' s. "moment of hesitation" · when he fioundered uncer-
tainly before adopting a pro-,1ar stanceo In the -~ears 
prior to the wa~, Dewey had served as the epitome of 
intelligent humanitarianism and had exhibited a sincere 
desire to create a free and peaceful societyo His moment 
51 
·' 
,:. \..'r . -
. of hesitation was his fall from grace, the point at iv-hich 
~-·· ' ~, ,' 
. : .... ·," 
,,.1'1 
he disappointed some of his most faithful followers 9 . includ.-
~ng Re.,ndolph B·ourne. Bourne~ s antagonistic reaction was ~ · 
to be expected, for he was more than a mere follower of 
· Dewey; he had been a student,,, disc:1ple, and a close ac-
.. 56 quaintance, if not a ~riendo His response to the de-
fection·or the academicians was a succession of cutting 
· attacks. Betrayal was not to be· eas~ly countenanced in 
one so idealistic and hopeful •. 
Bourne's war-time articles -dfalt almost exclu~ively 
56The exact relationship between Bourne and Dewey is 
. ; 
.. : ; i 
. ,...~;;;:~ff:, -. :; . 
-r. ·>-~".\,r,. ;··.: 
' . ·.,,_·; 
_, . 
;\ .· ' 
. ·: .. -
,· 
.. 
..... ' . 
· uncertaino In the early thirties, Delfey, in response to the questions of Blanche Ivlessii:,te then working on a· bio- ~: 
. ··.,· 
...... ·· 
graphy of Bour11e 9 ackno1r1ledged knowing Bourne only_ as an undergraduat.e l(cited in F11ler9 Pol45 9 Qfootnote #91 o This is highly unli~ely 9 however, for Bourne visited the Dewey fami~y in August 1913 9 'trihile in Lausanne 11 &titzerland (referred to in a l:ettar from RoSoBo to Alyse Gregory,. 10 August 1913) o Furthermore, Alvin Johnson, a 11ri ter. to·r the Ne'{r{ Republi.9 at the times, stat_ed that Deli'ey was offended by a book review Bourne had written and sub-sequently refused to serve ·on the editoria~ board of the Dial tr1i th Bourneo Har.old Stearns· raca11ed seeing the two talking in the office of the Dial 9 while Robert Morse . , · 
• 
. ;·> 
Lovett~ editor of the ~-4va1. 9 remembered that he ,1as sup- ~· posed tonheal the 1r1ound between the t\1'10 9 but Bourne died before anything could· be achieved ·(Moreau, ppo24S-6). The rift ,1as certainly quite real1) for Floyd Dell iv-rote: 111 remem~er that, because it<lwas my indignation. against . Professor Det,1ey ~nd my descri.ption of· Pragmatism as 8con-. venient surrender of .. ,Principles to force majaureu at. 
·some Village party 9 ,1hich made Randolph Bourne my friend. 11 . Homecoming (New York~ Cel933), PPe3lO-ll. 
LI . 
i 
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t. w1th the relationship of the intellectuals to the war~· 
Wi~h a11 academician in1 the "Vlhite House 9 it ,,as inevitabl,, 
·however, that the 'tfri tings should touch American strategy 
and one essay dealt exclusively with this aspect of the 
( 
-~ar. . Predictably, the article~c::,reflecting its content, 
~ 
. in the title, · "The Collapse of American S'£rategy111 --con.::.:·'·(~. , 
IP..-·-·· 
' 'i" 
. ,-<.,;.:;,..,-demned the President and his polici·es. Bourne h~d always .. 
. •:'' •. . 
been skeptical about Wilson's neutrality, having seen the 
pro-Allied bias of the administration from the very be-
ginning. As. early as 1915, he had pointed out that "by 
taking sides against Germany, we have committed ourselves. J 
to the arduous task of setting up ideals more worthy than 
her•• ••• "57 Nonethel~~s, in his a.na,1ysis of strategy, he 
wrote as if taking policy-makers at their words, assuming~ 
' ~ 
. 
52 
,· ' _, ..... 
that what .they s~µght was_a negotiated end of the war. l 
In actuality, Bourne had no faith in the pronouncements ~ 
or the 11over~1ntellectualized11 President and entirely ). 
disbelieved the justi~ications of American foreign policy. 
He considered l·lilson' a attempts to achieve ~ negotiated •. . ,,..,.......j 
. 
. ,_., 
peace at the end of 1916 as "the· high·water level of Amer-
ican strategy, 11 since the suoces.s of that venture· would ~ 
· · .. have given the United States, ·as the most powerful neutral 
57Bourne, "American Use for German Ideala,n War and the 
· Intellectu~~s 0 p050; ~eprinted from the New Republic, 11T (Septo 19l5J 9 ll7~l9o It was prima.riay this arti-cle which 
· gave Bourne an early taste of \that it ,ias like to hold . · · 
.unpopular opinions 9 for he i1rote. to a friend~ 18Denun·ciat1on of my recent articles continue to . come ino I have become an impious, ungratefi.11 9 proe=German9 venomous viper0 '° Ro Se Bo to Elizabeth-Shepley Sergeant, lO·October 1915, The World of Rand.ol:5?h Bqurn~, P• 309. 0 
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nation, undisputed leadership in anyv 1 poss1b1e covenant 
. ·or nat1onso Unfortunatelys, the st1~ong pro=Allied bias 
. ' ' 
of the administration made war ineyi table when Germany 
'placed the entire Allied war effort in danger of collapse. 
\ ' u 
With entrance into the war, the Ame·rican role· changed. 
No longer could Wilson proclaim the country to be a 
-
mediator; American force was being applied against Ger-
., 
many, making mediation quite impossible. As. Bourne pointer-
\.. . . out, 
\ 
) 
The immediate task was to. preve.nt a·-oerm.ari 
victory in order to restore the outlines ot 
our strategy toward a_negotiated peac®o- Para-
doxically, therefore, our very participation ~ [in the war] ,11as a means of weakening our strat-
egy. 58 _ . . ~ 
The result of the ~dd1t1on of American force to the 
Allied ~111tary machine was not precisely what American 
. -
.,,.J 
planneF"s had expected., wrote Bourne. Instead of bringing 
the belligerents ··,clos·er':: to a negotiated peace, the effect 
was to prolong the.1, struggle. The Allies, ne,-1ly encour-
\ aged, pushed forward for the "knock-out blow, n while the 
Germans, equally aw.are of th(f~ changed oircumstanees, · 
fought with a new determination. This s1 tuation in tuftl 
sez'ved to counter~ct sti~~ anot~er element of American 
, . ' ? 
policy--the desire to see a democra.tic revo1ut1on Vin Ger-
. many. Bourne J;>redioted that the Germans, facing a foe 
. ·, 
whose stated goal was tota1 conquest, would instinctively 
cling.to their military leaders. 
58&urne, ;'The Collapse of American Strategy, I' War ~nd · 
the Intellectuals, pe25; aiso included in The Wor1d of· 
·RangolEh Bourne, ppol66-79. 
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r or the vlilson administration, of liberalizing Allied 
1, policy \ias fruetrctted, or rather su:rrenderedo \filson 
•• 
5" 
himself strung into the absolutistic spirit of the war 
by proclaiming,· in his Flag Day sppech and in.his note 
to Russia, a hard new policy. Bourne observed that 
• 
The note to Russia implied not only ,fy111son 1@1 loss of the in:1:'e,iative 1 :ror a ne~otia.,ted peace but even the desire for.ito UOThe day has come 
when 1:1e must conquer or submito to This has a 
very strang~ ring oorning from a President who 1n his very-:iar message still insisted that he had.not altered ·in any way the pr1nciules of his 09peace,without victory00 noteo59 -
. Itl·. other words, concluded Bourne, the strategy of a ne-
gotiated peace had passed out of American hands. FUrther, 
the American strategy had collapsed leaving those who 
~upported the war with no valid justification for par-
( tic1pat1on in it. Indeed, the pro-war liberals who had 
~ / "" 
?/ 
accepted the war as a path to peace were sufferih5 the 
huin111at1on of seeing their strategy prolong tne con-
flict. 
America.n strategy came up.der Bourne's scrutiny early 
in the we.r but not before the intellectuals had been · ' ~p.. . 
dealt with in the lead article in the Seven Arts series: 
''War and the Intellectuals$ 09 The "essay was written p~r-
~ 
itially in·:. respQnse to the New Republic editorial, "Who · ' 
. ~ 
.. 
Willed American Pa.rticipation? 11 ; primarily howevei', it 
'· c.ame as a reply to Dewey• s hesitations on the pages ot 
the Seven A.Jrts tl1.e mt>nth before. Bourne ·sa,r behind the · , 
preparedness move~nt th? forces of big business, who,. 
. ., 
- L 
·~ . · 59Ibid., p.29. ·· 
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under the leadership of militaristic nationalists like 
Teddy Roosevelt 9 n ~aught hold of ,one atler another of 
the intellectual groups o .. ,, • [Unti~ the murmurs [tor in-
tf)rventioii.] became a monotonous chant, and finally a 
chorus so mighty that to be.out of it was at first to~be 
.disreputable and finally obscene."60 The impetus for· 
preparedness and then for intervention came not from 
the masses--the farmers, small bttsinessmen, workillgmen 
a:tL"~remained apathetic--but from the least democratic 
• 
elements of society. The intellectuals, in ·accepting v 
and supporting the war, ·-had fallen in league with the 
very forces they had, as domestic reformers, so fre-
quently opposed. The very idea of an academic community 
supporting the war and then bragging that they had willed 
the war was, to Bournt\ a preposterous lapse of· intelli-
gence. 
'~"'.·.~ ' . 
. ' Not content to point out the major inconsistencies 
.J, 
of the intellectuals, Bourne proceeded to gibe them :f'or 
their condemnation of ninety-three. German professors who 
had issued a proclamation of support for their homeland . 
in 1914 and now found themselves going much further than 
had their German colleagues. The ma·jor fallacy remained, 
however, the.very acceptance of war at all, i.e. the re-c 
placement of creative tasks and values with a phenomenon 
· which was in essence ~nd in all_respects destructive. 
P\lrther, "nebulous 1dea1s·11 of questionable l'rorth (per-
·,> 60B · · ' '0W,., ·. · .d th I t .,11 · t 1 · 81 "~1 . d th I. 
' : •.. ,i':. ournev ' ar an e n e ec ua s, vv&r an e n-
tellectualsv Po4; also contained:!ln The World of ,.Randolph 
Bourine 9 PPe 147-58., . 
11 
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haps best epitomized by the phrase 100 percent American~ 
1am). had been passing from the American scene prior to 
1917 9 but 11 the shock or the war threw us back from [ouz3 
, •. I 
56 
- · pragma'tic work into an emotional bath of these old idea1s. 11 6l 
The·;. intelle~tuals had abd.ic~ted their posi ti'°ns as think-
y 
ere, preferring to immerse themselves in the purgative 
. of action regardle·ss of where it led. 11No one is left' 
to point out the undemocratic nature·o:r this war-lib-
~ ~ eralism. In a time of :fai tl1, skept!cism is the most in-
tolerable of all insults. '!62 
In complete opposition to Randolph Bourne's skep-
I 
t1c1sm, the intellectuals stood as an integral part ot 
J •, .. ) . 
the great American consensus. Their philosophical posi-
-
,I., tion as well as their social outlook h%.td led them to . .._., 
support the war with a fervor matched only by the earlier 
support of domestic reform. The successes of t~-,-~~~·-, pro-
,.. 
.::c"'ir)..4 ' / 
-~~ gressivism had euggeated to-them that it ·might be as easy\ 
to turn the war to creative p~rposese The optimism of ' 
" 
this possibility was weekly reflected on the pages of 
the New··~~epubl!c. Much of what appeared in the maga-
zirie was 1:1 ttle more than daydreaming or wishful thinking·, 
.. 
· but the basic rationale was quite representative of lib-
. ~-{iv., ·· -· • :,,-.' .. --=.·-. . 
• ' 
'ii . 
•t 
eral thought. If they obstructed the war effort they 
argued, the power of influence was lost. If,on the other 
hand, they responsibly approved, they could retain the· 
61Ibid. , . P• 10 • 
. 62Ibid., p. 5. O)' .. 
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"" ' power of guidance and c·ould, as Dewey wrote, use "their 
· e'nerg'ies to form, at a plftstic juncture,~ the conditions 
( 
and objects of our. entranceQ au63 To stand in opposition 
would have rendered them ineffective, ·1rresponaible,not 
/ 
to be heeded by the authorities; but to approve of their 
own free will and then try to influence the direction of 
•':'~~. 
d 
the war was seen as an application of-intelligence to 
the problem of the war. Brushing aside the fear of in- - "' 
., 
tolerance and suppression, the intellectuals viewed the '"-
war as a cre·ative opportunity. The objective was ever 
/ to ·~, :) aehiev e mastery of events in . order to turn them to 
,. 
constructive ends, in this case a league of peace and a 
world democratic revolution. They felt sure of their 
abilities to control events by becoming a part of the 
moving forces. 
This line of thinking raised certain difficulties 
as Bourne rapidly percei ,red. The intel,.lectuals rested 
their case on what should have been to them a disturbing 
\ J 
ambigui t,y. Assuming th~t they considered the ·war to be 
an irresistable fo;rce rolling in over them which t·hey 
decided to support, they were 1eft with a problem. If 
the war was too powerful to prevent, how could it be 
weak enough:~ to control1 ·It· was· likely to increase, not 
·_ decrease, in 1ntens1 ty, rendering any attempts at control 
less feasible than had been possible during the perio.d 
of neutra11 ty. If, on the other hand, the intellectuals 
" 
63Dewey, ''The Future of Pacifism, 11 II:584. 
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had led the country into the war, they had to confront 
certain discrepancies between their own conceptions ot 
events and reali trr, a-s·· \tell as face the possib11it;y that 
" the war would not yr.eld the creative results they sought. 
. ,/ .. . . "\~~) 
Dewey wrote that Wilson "had unmistakably plotted a line 
Which led inevitably to conflict l·Ti th Germany in case. 
the latter.should take ·the course which she· finally 
' 
adopted<! ••• ••64 This p_a.~ticular statement points up one 
of the most serious flaws in Dewey's attitudes on the war.·, 
While arguing that pacifism and opposition to tne war 
.. 
surrendered any possibility of controlling events, he c 
calmly announced that ·thief- was precisely what Wilson did 
in the year before the United States entered the war. 
Wilson surrendered his freedom of action, his potential 
. f 
of acting independently and creatV,ely, by pla.cing~the 
. / ,, 
,,,...-· 
. 
decision-for war 1n the hands of the Germans. Through 
his emphasis upon the Sussex p~edge, ~Tilson turned the 
1n1 ti-ati ve over to them. The President surrendered for 
a policy of dr1f~ any chance of achieving~mastery; drift 
" 
on a. current that led irrevocably to war. The 1ntellec-,-
tuals in this situation shoul.d have sought a solution 
... 
to the.war within the confines of neutrality rather than 
-~. 
resorting to a war they talked themselves into thinking 
· they had willed. "An 1nte1lectual class that was wholly 
··. :rational woul,d ha.V8'' 08.lled insistentl,y . f()r peace and not 
p.:,.'··~ 
for war," wrote Bourne.65 Instead they turned to their 
~
4Ib1d., P• 358 
5Bourne, "War and- the Intellectuals,":. p. 8 •. · .Y\;• · · ·· 
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illusory view o~ real1 t·y, attempting to control the 1rra- -
t1onality of war. 
Intent upon achieving maste1:7,tha war. liberals 
busied themselves with denunciations of the pacifists 
who so obviously refused to ,~ove with the dominant forces 
in the country. The attacks were themselves based upon 
a conception of pacifism to which pacifists. themselves 
. • 
l 
• l 
r 
would pot have agreed. In view of the really small num-
ber of pacifists ,nd the much larger body of super-pa-
triots conducting themse1ves 1n·'·decidedly undemocratic· 
~ 
fashion, this harping on the pacifists seems extremely 
strang_e. . r--.~-Wi thin the context of their pro-war outlook 
.. 
however, the intellectuals saw ~the refusal to support I. 
the war as a far more serious lapse of intelligence than 
any actions by those who favored the war. The series of 
attacks printed in the New Republic strongly suggested 
that the war liberals were n·ot committed to any specific 
set of policies so much as they were to the idea of com-
mitment itselr.66 What they really feared was neutrality 
66 
Lasch, pp. 191-2. Harold Stearns, writing in the early twenties, put·. down in terms of personal observati·on his conception of the int.ellectual.s during the war: 11\fhen thought is despise~ and f~ared~ one must,make action and 
·,"· .. ::ir~·r,a.-:,;,,_ verbiage do duty for thought; one mus,t »shoiv- resultso' . The pitiful b1~eakdo1t1n of American intellectuals under the 
.. · :, ... ,,:,' ···; .. : 
_ pressure of ,irar-b.ysteria can be traced ·:,to the working 
of this· immemorial national tradi tiono To stand out-side the current of events in;:·splendid iaolatio11z, lilce Randolph Bourne, was felt to be both erratic and snobQls,, and also ineffective; the.,t i1as the crushing argument 9· 1neffectiveo . Every _intel1ectual prided himself on being· pragmati~v and_ bristled ti'ith indignation at the ultima ..te 
. sceptic ;{siq) ff of any values supposedly invo.lved in 'win- .,,,. 
. ning t~e ltaro .. on A;m_erica and the ;loup.g Intellectuals, · · ·,., 
~. (New· .. _;Yo,rk, c.1921f, pp.49-50.·_ .·. · 
··~ 
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and political impotence, attracteq.·_ as intellectuals and 
. ,, 
academicians freque~tly a1.W by the use of forceo Rather 
take up the ban11er of ,~,ar,,. for which i~Tilson 8 s moral c·ru-
sade had provided a perfect rationale, than ~amain in-
active. But as Bourne pointed out, 
••• if 1 t is aJ question of· controlling. the 11ar, 
it is difficult to see how the child on the 
back of the mad elephant is to be any more ef-
fective in stopping the beast than_is the child . 
who tries to stop him from the groundo67 · 
The analogy is extremely apt, for the intellectuals in 
mov~ng with war were far_safer_than skeptics like Bourne 
who continued to oppose the "mad elephant. 11 Yet, once the 
war was over, those on top were destined to suffer the 
ffathL,,of the masses--for let·t1ng the "elephant·" get out 
of control in the first place. f 
Confronted with this situation, Bourne undertook a 
searching analysis of' the intellect-gals' moti v·a tion, 
seeking the circuitous path which had brought them to be 
on top of the elephant. He began by t~urn1ng to the phi1-
osophy of John Dewey. Dewey had forJ!lulated from the work 
of Pierce and James his own particular brand of pragma-
tism, generally referred to as 1nstrumental1sm. He placed 
. ~~· 
emphas_is not upon the metaphysical aspects of philosophy, 
- ~ . 
but upon the practical cons~quences of thought. Instru-
, . I 
mentalism was not so much a ph1losoph1c system as it was 
a way of approaching life.~ Central to the concept was 
.. ~- ·---- .. -.c~ _ I. 
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the application of the scientific methoq--1. e. tb.e method · 
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67Bourne, "War and the Intellectuals," Pi• 12. 
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of 1ntell1gence--o~ solving problems. Ideas were.construed 
not as truths-=nl(irrors of realritycz,=,but rather as plans of 
aotiono In other words, thought was constdered instrumental· 
in the control of the, environment; and consequently, 
ideas were considered to have value only·in so far as they·· 
affected experience and progress. II . . • •• The pragmatic 
0 
.. 
theory of intelligence means that the funct~on of the 
:mind is to project new and more complex ends--to free 
... 
experience from routine and from caprice. 1168 within 
if 
the framework of this outlook, there could:be no such 
", 
thing as an absolute, unless p~rhaps it was the method-
- * 
ology. Indeed, pragmatists replaced earlier absolutes 
with the new one of the scientific method of observation, 
experimentation, hypothesizing, and reflective reasoning. 
rr· 
. ,. The P"agmatic attitude presented Bourne with his 
. ' 
major problem of analysis. Why ·had the intel~ectual 
pragmatists found it so easy to accept t~e war? In his 
' 
article "Twilight of Idols, 11 symbolizing his final· break · 
( . 
with Dewey, and 11 ·conscience and Intelligence in War, 11 in 
"-, 
reply to Dewey's , "'Conscience and Compulsion, 11 he. und.ertook 
a search for the underlying values which. instrumentalism .--
-~---
' had taken for granted and which·were being ignored by the. 
!a.rring country. As ~ critic, his task was an especially· 
,.. · · d1ft1cult one, for American pragmatism ha1S always rested 
~··' 
\ ·~ 
upon 08 miles of submerged conviction'° ir1h1ch enabled the 
/ . 
pragmatist to dismiss his cri ~1cs wit,hout even paying them · 
i 68newey, et al., Creative'''1;ntelligence: Essays in the 
PJ::agmatio ~ttitude (New York, c. 1917), p.63. · 
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the complime~· or an argument. 69 Perhaps Bourne could be 
put off 9 but he could not be/endlessly ignored; the ques-
tions he asked were too vital to the philosophyo His 
. ~ . 
. 
critique was not based upon logic or ~pistemology 9 since 
he was not a tecblu:cal philosopher, but it could most 
aptly be described as a pragmatic evaluation of prag.:. 
,l matism. 
Bourne I s critique focused on three key weaknesses · 
revealed 1n the pragmatist's arguments: <l acceptance of 
J 
·· ... absolutes, adaptation,and emphasis upon technique. !Dhe 
ques~ion of absolutes seems a strange one to have to con-
sider with regard to the pragmatic~intellectuals, for 
•1.nothing is so disagreeable to the pragmatic mind as any 
kind of absolute."70 T.he ,,rar, however, presented a ·sit-
., 
._ 
u~tion that t-l1ey were not ready t9 confront. In spite of 
their contentions in the New Renublic tat they had willed 
the war, it was far more likely that e ents had been too 
strong for them to oppose and that they had chosen to 
support the war in hopes of maintaining mastery of events. 
They managed to preserve the,· semblance of their philosophy 
by permitting the war to engulf them and then proposing 
t_o tame 1 t and turn it to their own creative :purpo see. 
In their inability to prevent war, the intellectuals found 
it impossible to countenance any oppof?ition ta· the_~ar 
I 
effort. Dewey, in his irritation over the. pacifists, . . .. 
~·····. 
6. . . . - . 9touis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. (New 
Yorkp 1955) 9 Po 590 · , . 
. · 70.~urn~ ~ / ~ .ll~:t"' Diary 11 " War a.nd the Intellectualc!i p. 39; 
also. reprinted in The World of Rando1ph Bourne~ PPol 0~90. 
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wrote that opponents of the war could have attached con-
.. 
· science and 1nte111genc:~ to valid forces moving in other 
. ' . 
·. 1 . directions. Bourne _pointed out, .. how'@Ver 9 that 
V . ~ 
\,. 
I . 
' 
•, . ,· 
"' 
••• in wartime there are literally no valid 
forces moving in anp·ther directiono 1far de-
termines its own en~,~~victory, and goverrurient 
crushes out automatically all forces that de-
flectp or threaten to deflect, energr from the 
path of organization to that 'end ...... _,1 
That y,ar put an end to a choice of goals other "than vic-
tory and that there remained no alternatives save acquies-
cence or opposition (the latter carrying the possibility 
of persecution by the authorities) should have been enough 
.. 
to insure that the intellectuals would not use war as· a 
technique for any purpose whatever. But, Bourne wrote, 
' \ 
war appears as just "that urgent, inevitable crisis'' to 
·, 
which all purposes must yield; a necessity that dominates 
~ 
a natiqn '· s life. "v-lar is just that absolute situation 
• 
which is its own end and its own means, and which speed-
ily outstrips-the power ot intel11gent a~d creative con~ 
trol. 1172 The pro-war intellectuals working under the 
illusion that their intelligence could turn the conflict 
to creative ends perm1 tted t·hemselves to slide into the 
final and most.complete absolute. Instead ot trans-
cending the routine and the mechanical., applying their 
ab111 ties to the formul~tion of soc1~lly u·se:f\tl ends, 
they accepted an absolute means to an uncertain end. 
Perceiving this failure ·or Dewey's 1nstrumeritalism, 
71Ib1d., p. ·41. i • 
72Eourne 9 "Conscience and Intelligence in lVar, n- The 
World of Ranq.olph Boyr:qeR Po 194;. reprin~ed from Jlial, · 
XLIII ( s-epto 1917), 193m)5• 
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Bourn~ had to reject the w~r and his earlier philosophy 
and stand.in oppositiono His disdain· for absolutes ran 
· · deeper than his philosophy, for they suggested the re-
straint and mediocrity of small to\"Tn lifeo jfar itself 
exemplified this sense of the.herd mind busily reviving 
small town· orthodoxy. 73 ,, -
. Instrumeutalism was excel1~n;t,.~ ... fo.r $ppl1cat1on to · 
~ __ ··-·······~•.h•' --...-••-_ ••-·--r··•·'""""''"····' ", ... , 
' 
' . - . 
. ·.' 
peacetime problems Bourne concluded, but could not be 
used to confront the war since war was beyong the bounds 
of reasonable control. Instead of free formulation of 
values, the intellectuals ended up exhibiting nothing 
more creative than adaptation. Their outlook was geared· 
to meeting si tuat1ma rather than seeking to transcend; 
7 
~nd consequently, the demands of a ti~e of crisis resulted 
. . , /J 
. '~ in the failure of their philosophy. Bourne himself had ;; 
d~ 
. 
verbalized this situation around 1912 with his remark 
that ''Thought is a practical organ of adaptition1 ... 1.,to envi~·-~ 
ronment, knowledge is a tool to encompass this adaptation 
rather than a picture of reality. 11 74 Whit Bourne saw 
,,.: 
" 
unflawed in 1912 h·e ·saw revealed 1n its f'ailings in 1917. 
He realized that instrumentalism was workable in a ration-
al setting under malleable conditions but in the abao-
lutistic, conform1st1c demands of war it would become a 
philosophy of adaptation. Instrumental1sm in war-time 
73Resek, ''Introduction, 11 War and the Intellectuals, 
. , 
P•. Xii 0 
· 74Quoted in Brooks, F,enollosa ••• , P• 268. 
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no 1onger dealt with values and ends, but settled upon 
.!;: 
mere justification of t1ar polic1eso 1It became a sta:t;;_ic 
philosophy ··of meeting· events instead· of postulating 
goals and proposing values toward which to work; in a 
word, 1 t became adjustment o By September 1917 ,· the re-
·sul ts of this phenomenon ,1ere already apparent as the 
,, 
intellectuals 1 · statements became increasingly a 'refiec~ _ .,·: . 
. tion of what existed. Gradually the attitude grew that· 
1ndi v1dua.1 thought was useless and II that the on1y waytf, ·. . 
. . ,;e-
we can count is as a cog in the great wheel. 11 75 Bourne 
was quiclr to point out that the war liberals would have 
to pay the-penalty of seeing their.justifications dis-
appear one by one as he had already demonstrate.~-in his_ 
;.art.icle' on strategy. The intellectuals would then be 
left with the choice of either becoming "genuine Real-
politiker" or accepting the frustration of their failure. 
The only serious defense that Dewey could offer for this 
state of af':f'a.irs was =,an assumption that one free to <) 
choose intelligently would choose to accept the war. 
,, 
I 
"But the mind that is skeptical of ~hese present f'orce_s,--
-..&a 1 t not thrown back to a choice of resistance or 
·· apathy?'Lwrote Bourne. 76 In the failure or Dewey• s in-
.strumentalism, Bourne's course was clear-~resistance. 
Opposition to trar at the level at which Bourne 
. ' 
. . . I 
worked had to take into account, tp.e ef.fect ·of pragmatism.' s · • 
heavy emphasis on tachniquet but the w-ar had revealed to 
/ 
· 
7
7~Bour:ne 9 °
0War · and the Intellectuals, 11 p. 12. 
Bourne, "Conscience and Intelligence in \far," p. 195. 
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·him the extreme degree to which values had been subord1-
natedo This development derived inadvertently·· from the 
\\ 
"unhappy ambigl;lity 88 over how values .1r1ere createdo II ••• 
. It became easier and easier to assume that just any growth· 
was justified and 1 almost any activity· valuable so long· 
as it achieved ends.u77 ~ Indeed, wrote Bourne, ~ericans 
. have always been given to pointing to their accomplish-
ments \"ti thout considering the value of '\!that they achiJ:tved. 
He saw war as a denial of values in which routine ~nd 
/ ' 
mechanistic action took over. In the words of Woodrow 
Wilson: "Let there be no misunderstanding. our pres .. · 
ent and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing > 
·-, 
shall turn us a.side from it until it is accomplished.H78 
To the radical, any such policy.was prep~sterous, for it 
necessitated either blind compliance or the necessity 
or showing just how winning the war would contribute to 
human and democratic values. Where Wilson saw victory 
as the goal, Bourne asked to be shown the values for 
which the country was fighting. Bourne was not alone in 
his attack, for Van Wyck Brooks came to the same conclu-
sion, possibl, after being exposed to Bourne's writings. 
He indicted the pragmatic intellectuaJa·ias being little 
more than mechanists, lacking the vision, dynamism,.and 
·, 
·--
77aourne, IITwilight of Idols," War and the Intellectuals, 
p. 61; also reprinted in :'Ela, vTorld of RandolEJl ~ourn.e 9 PP• 191~2030 , '' ~ . 
78Taken from Wilson's Fi~h Annual Mesaa~e to Congress, 
Sha:t'f 9. L; 446 o Equally revealing . of Bourne s point 'ti"as 
Wilson us statement contained in the Proclamation of the ·· · 
Selective Draft Acti tuTb.e wb.o1e nati-on must be a team, 
in which each man shall play the part for which he is 
best fitted~ ibid, p. 398. 
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'"\ ' the ideals to transform society, capable of doing little 
· save codifying the society 9 rearranging already extant 
allegiances,- and imposing upon the people programs de-
veloped in a ~ore dyn~mic societyo79 
~-
In spite of his. realization of the role technique 
had come to play in instrumentalism, Bourne found it most 
difficult to understand the readiness l'Tith which the in-· 
\ 
~ te1lectuals flocked to serve the government in the prose-
~ . · · cut1on of the war. For some time, academic scholarship 
had become a. matter of routine and technique, a tendency ·· 
greatly. ac,.c.elerated by the war •. Nonetheless, Bourne was 
• 
', •• 1 ,' : ~ 
.-, ', 
, ' 
' ~ 
.... . 
surprised to find so ma~y turning to the mechanistic 
r tasks of war. Charles Beard, Walter Lippmann, Walter. 
Weyl, Dean Frederick Keppel of Columbia, and the philoso-
pher Franklin Giddings we:r;-e but a few of the more promin-
ent to be found 1end1ng assistance in various capacities 
to the .American war process. Dewey, foundtthe vrar• s greatest 
confirmation in just those agencies that were most exemplary 
. o:r routine, such as Baruch' s War Production Board. BO J 
. Dewey felt that the implications of these agencies for~:.~· 
the reorganization of society were the chief benefits of 
the war. He was certainly correct in this respect, for 
1:. ~~-~ ~-
h79:srooks, Letters and Lea.de~~hip (New York, 1918), PP• ll2~l3o For additional support of Bourne's criticisms 
see Lewis ],fmruford Os section ·"The Pragmatic Acquiescen¢e11 in The Golden Da: A Stud in American Ex erience and -Ou~ure New York, 192 , PPo 157=95., 
::_·Sidney K&tplan 9 uao_oial Engineers as Saviorsg Effects 
·9f 11orld tlar 1· on Some American Liberals, 11 Journal o:r the 
His toeo~l of Idea~, XVII ( 1956), 360 e · 
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the agencies established during t·he war served as the 
. practice"l examples for Ne.w Deal reorganiz'ationso .As has· 
.. been pointed~·m:r-t9 18 t,he war confir.rned the triumph of large- . 
. ~~r-
. 81 ~ 
· scale industrial organizationo 18 All of which, in · 
Bourne''s mind, did absolutely nothing to change anything; 
1 t was merely a matter of technicians fooling with the 
. sy.stem. Nowhere was there a change to improve the quality 
of lite. 
• The primacy of technique was most· clearly illustrated 
1n the younger 1ntell1gens1a who were so uniformly follow-
"I 
era of John Dewey and his work. Bourne found them to be 
. . 
... pitifully unprepared" for the war and wholly lacking in 
the intellectual strength necessary to formulate values 
and ends. Rather they turned to the. technical side of-
'-
the war in keeping with what their education had empha-
·-, ·· 
1 sized. They served in their various capacities as· "eff'i-
. . ' 
,, •' 
'• 
' . 
cient instruments of the war technique accepting with 
· 82 11 ttle question the ends as announced from above. 11 And 
here Bourne touched a point which, had he lived long 
enough,he could have seen carried to its extreme in the 
,, fascist countries a. little over a decade later. As a 
resu1t of this situation, American si::>oiety fell short 
of realizable goals, Americans, Bour11e·'~ir.ote, constantly 
11 t1nker00 ·1 tvi th their society just as they do with ~b.e tariff~ 
. . . ' . 
. 
"Our public activity is too much a, perpetual patching up 
of the old machine so that it will run smoothly. What 
81 · Leuchtenburg, P• 42. 
82Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," P• 60. 
. I" 
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.. · we alway~·;\:trf to do 1~ get rid of tb.e friction, rather 
· · · than improve the producte 1183 Consequently O technique 
·. alv1ays outshot ~ision in this static methodologyo "The 
. . 
· worltingcaout of this Am·erican philosophy in ·an intellectual 
life then has meant an exaggerated emphasi~~orthe mech-
\ 
an!cs of' life at the expense of the quality ~f 1iving.n84 
-, rl I 
Bourne concluded his critique of instrumentalism wtth. 
,·,·, ·. 
the charge that Dewey had so altered pragmatism as to 
. . 
slay the spirit of William James. Bourne had been some-
what disaffected from Dewey for some time prior to the 
final break 1n June 1917; he fal t a closer ti'e · to James 
than he did to Dewey, arid w~ beginning to make the 
shift as early as 1916. With Dewey's moment of hesitation, 
Bourne's attention was drawn to Dewey's instrumental cor-
ruption of pragmatism. Dewey was both more and less.a 
r~lativist than James had been and herein lay the problem 
of his instrumentalism. He was less tolerant of :1x1t1es 
than James had been to the extent that movement and the 
need for action came to be a new absolute. On this point 
I Bourne could condemn him and his intellectual followers, 
/ 
since their necessity for action had led them to accept 
the absolutes of war and the warfare state in the hopes 
of achieving nebulous goals. The ~um total of the exper-
\ 
ience was the failure of 1nstrumental1sm in a crisis sit-
uation and the betrayal of the intellectuals by their own 
... ,. •, ·, . . ' . ·" ,.. . . 
~-. . . ' ~ .J' t . '. ' ' . 
.. 83Bourlle, "Practice vs. Product, 11 unpublished type-
script, Bourne Maso, P• 3, 
ts4Bourne, "Twilight of Idols, 11 p. 62. 
,· •\ 
"' 
' "',II 
... 
' . . 
-~ ~-- -•'"'- •. ~.,,._, .... , .... _._..........,.~;,....-.~"-~· ~ .··. 
.I' 
69 
,, 
,, 
\, ' 
~ 
' ..._ 
. ' . 
.• 
.. ,_,J __ . - -_.-....,..J - !,!.,~~ -. "- - -~---~ . ~ ... , ... r;. ...• ~. ---·,·~ -~ .•. .I-
i . 
· I 
I 
- ' 
.,.. . 
• .• ·r # 
' ' 
.. 
:,.. ·-.• 
i 
'. 
. ~· 
,· 
____ ..-,_,----- ~ ~-- -
c:::::::]_0_, 
I . 
;cc.'-· 
-, ' 
. ' 
philosophic system.85 
.. 
II 
1rli th the appearar1:ce· of 0Tw111ght of Idols, 11 Bourne I a. 
series of major anti='ttar eJrt·icles came to an abrupt end, . 
/ , ~ 
In the October 1917 issue of the.Seven Arts there appeared 
a special request for funds to continue publishingo 
•• After only . one year o:r publ.ioat:i!on, Mr·s o Rankin, -v1ho. had 
subsidized the venture, \vi~hdrew her supporto There 
could be 11 ttle doubt as to why · the financial suppor~ r 
· ended. 
L ~ 
The ;increasingly vicious anti-war position or · 
the magazine 'made }1rse Rankin uneasy. Furthermore, her 
relatives, who were involved in a major food. industry·, 
put pressure on her and she eventually gave in, with-
drawing the Seven Arts, ... f3Ubs1dy. 86 Apparently the oppo-
sition to the war had not gone unnoticed by the author-
ities, fqr the Justice Department men posing as writers 
had· come around the Seven Arts office searching for 
I 
traces of seditious· conduct, and this 1n 1 tself may :b. 
have been enough to frighten Mrs. R&nkin.87 The attempt 
to combine financial backing with full editorial freedo~ 
,· 
had failed; patriotism was more important than culture • 
85For a study of' the attraction of intellectuals of 
another period to action and movement without due con-
sideration :ro·r ends~ see John Po Diggins 1 "Flirtation ' 
·w1 th Fascism: American :Pragmatic Liberals and Mussol1n1} s 
Italy,ao American Historical Reviews, LXXI (1965=6) 9 487- · 
506e 
860ppenheimp 11 The Story o:f' the Seven Arts9 QO Po164o -,1 
87The -statement concerning Just,ice Department agents / 
:was made by vlaldo Frank9 who had been an editor .of the 
Seven Arts,, in an interview with MOl?.ea:u.,1e.p.lb.·2·.-···:.·. . -T ..... .....,..1 ...... -.-"'~k..,w' AZ 2C,'Q ~ .. • . / 
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In the years after the ·war, most of those associated 
- . 
with the magazine placed the resp9nsibili ty for 1 ts demise ( ... ,....~""J 
on Bourne 8 s war articleso Waldo Frank~ one of the ed1~ 
tors, itrrote, ho,rever, that inter11al disagreement among 
, the editors, e$pecially over· the anti-war position, had 
as much to do 11i th the magazine's end as did: the anti-
war articles themselves. BB · James Oppenheim, the editor -
in-chief, maintained that discus~ion of the war was a 
-_ -_ va~id subj act while others~ on the staff,, chi.efly V'.an· 
.Wyck Brooks, would have preferred to evade political 
. issues entirely. In any event, Bourne was far from the 
only one writing anti-war material,for James Oppenheim 
wrote anti~war e~1torials while articles by many opponents 
of the war, including socialist leader John Reed, were 
printed. 
The suspension of the Seven Arts most effectively 
·silenced Bourne, for his work was far too•controv~rsial 
to be carried by other magazines with the exception ot 
those like the Masses which the government was in the 
..... process of suppressing. Even the Dial refused to acaept 
-
88waldo F.ra.nk, The Rediscoverx of, Americai(New York, 1929)g Po 318. Van Wyck Brooks and James Oppenheim, both 
editors 9 placed the respons1 bili ty on Bourne's articles; 
see Fenoll·osao o o 9 Po 309 o :&&ams Untermeye:r like-v1ise 
blamed :Bourne for the faj.l~re· of the Seven Ar11,s; see 
ones: The Recollections -of Louis Unterme er (New 
York, Co 19·5 9 PPo 39c= o Robert.Frost 9 a member of the staff of the Seven Arts, incorporated the idea in a jingle: In the Dawn of Creation that morning 
·---
' 
I remember I gave you fair warning 
The ar .. ts are but six 
You add on politics 
__ . And the seven ,~,111 all die a-Bourning •.. 
. ' 
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. major~ articles from hi.~ -despite h1·s appointment as con-
tributing editor in March 19170 Ellery Sedgewick wrote 
. ···~,i..-
ii! 
to him explaining that the Seven Arts '°hubbubau had made 
89 him too controversial to be published in the Dialc 
Rather obviously upset over the developments, n-··--L:Jv Y.J. -1.1. ~ 
·' . 
wrote a friend: 
The m~gazines I write for die violent deaths 
· and all my thoughts seem unprintable. If I 
start to 1r1ri te onlpublic matters I discover \ 
that my ideas are seditious, and if I start t~ 
to write a.novel, I discover that my outlook 
. · is immoral if not obsoeneo \1hat then is a 
literary man to do if he has to make his living 
by his pen?90 
. . 
Nonetheless, he kept quite bu-sy after the collapse of 
the Seven Arts. His writings \*lhich appeared after Octo-
ber 1917~-not only in the Dial, but in the New Rapl.\._blic 
and a few other magaz!~es as well--were almost exclusively 
book reviews, although there was a scattering of non-
controversial essays. He kept busy through 1918 working 
on numerous book r_eviews,~ translating· a French novel, 
organizing his Hj.stor~ of a Literary Radic,al which was 
not published until after his death 9 beginning the novel 
he had always wanted to write, and finally composing the 
~nalysis of the state which he never f1n1~hed. 
VI. Bourne and the· State 
'' 
- The manuscript for "The State" found among Bourne's 
89Brooks 9 Fenollosa.e., PPe3ll-12. Brooks added that 
Schofield Thayer and Sibley Watson, who bought the Dial, 
planned to make Bourne an editor, or possibly even 
editor-in~chiefD but he.died before any action was taken, 
P• 3120 . 
90Bourne to Everett Benjamin, 26 N·ov. 1917, Bourne Mas •. 
._,·., ·-'" ·: -' ··"·•'-<',•.• -' .-_, '·· '. ., _, ·:.-,,--· 
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effects after his death, was of much greater length than 
any of his other writingse The segment was pro~ably un-
•.,{ 
' ·, . 
.-, 
dertalten. as the beginning -or a full length book iihich was --
--· 
. r,-·:·. 
. . 91 to represent the culmination of his political thinking. . 
Many of his attitudes had been crystallized and focused 
by the war, but there had been little basic change in 
---·---------·---·-------------.- _b,is political thought over the years, for many of the 
i!H-:-S. . -- , 
ideas in his earlier w~1tings were more emphatically ver-
.-~ balized in 81-The State. 11 The article was by no means a 
.• 
', ,' 
·_ break w1 th his earlier thinking; 1 t was quite defini taly 
a part·of a continuumthat stretched back to his Columbia-~ 
~,,.if not his _pre-Columbia.,--days. 
... Bourne began his analyais of the State with a seman-
tic differentiation of the concepts of Nation, Gov,rn-
91John A. Moreau wrote that nThe State" was not the beginning of a book, but probably an article for a peri-
odical despi ta its· forty pa§a""=length0 He supports t.his 
conclusion by pointing out th~t there were references in the lv'ork vrhich related to current developmentso 11 0bvi-
ously the author f alt the writing ,iould be,. clear to any immediate readero Bourne was too professional to make time1y remarks in a composition intended as a book which 
might not see the light for many monthsABB {ppol84=5)o 
He further cites the testimony of Agnes de Lima who claim-
ed that the fra§ment on 08 The State18 and the "Autobio-graphic Chapter were found crumpled up in the waste-baske~t of Bou14'ne 8 s ·. room after his det:1.,th9 (pol8l~) o If this is indeed t1/\ue 9 1 t might be a more lilrely supposi-
t~on that Bourne thraw the writings away in a delirium 
of sickness, for 9 being a professional writer9 he would 
not very liltely have thro1ivn so lengthy a piece of work 
. awayo Furthermore, Bourne rewrote his material over and 
over until he had honed it to a degree that satisfied him0 If nThe State80 -vras then a-··rough draft=>-as the 
reeJding of' it sugg~~ts~=stylistic criticism and compari-, 
sons of the work would seem to be invalid as a basis for discounting ite Moreau has just had his dissertation 
on Bourne publishedi) &nd has.- nc>"t ·changed ·his O attit.ude · on thi·S ; and·;· otl1er. .. points~- -- -;·.,. 1... . :... J' ~·~. ; .. i-'· .. -: c ~ : . 
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.· menti) and State.. The Nation he conceived as the aggre-
gate of peoples living within certain territorial con~ 
. f1nes 9 ' 0a ;~se popu1ation .spreading over a certain geo-
··c• ... ; 1:~J'· . ' :, 
~\.('",;, 
. 
. 
. graphical portion _of the earth's surface 9 speaking a 
common· .. ·· .. rtanguage 9 and living in a homogeneous ci viliza .. 
tion0 fo92 A . cultural or aocial conc~pt 0 the Nation was 
c.omp1 stely ,-11 thout political connotations. The Govern-
ment, similar in this regard, was merely the instrument 
by which the ·Nation was ordered and run, and as such, 
represented a neutral force, nei th~r good nor bad per 
se, but susceptible to use by forces or-. social gooq. or 
soc1a1 evil. The State, however, was for Bourne , a deeid-
. ·-· .. ·.• 
. ·, 
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'• .. , edly .· negative concept. He meant by· State those ele-
·' 
, 
- . 
... 
• 
• 
. 
. 
ments of government which appeared in war-time, but went 
0 
u~noticed ( at least in his lifetime) during peace; i.e. 
the <lOercive, all-directing, and all-powertul aspects of 
the strong central government. During war, "tb.e Stata 
becomes what in peace-time it has vainly struggled to 
b·ecome--the inexorable arbiter and determinant or men.' s 
bits1nesses and att1 tudes and opinions. 1193 Bourne thought 
of the State concept as reduced to nothing more than a 
shadowy emblem "during time of peace, reasserting it-
self in the blind conf'ormist drive of war." In some 
countries, the State concept was ever present in the 
,r royal or military trappings that appealed to the emotions. 
In a rapul;>lic1, hov1ever, military trappings were, the most 
) · 92Bourne 11 11 The State, 11 The ~lorld of' Randolph Bourne,__p.246; 
also included in War and the Intellectuals 9 PPe 65~104G 93Ib1d., ppt)248-9. 
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extreme example of this phenomenon and were /g,nerally 
:· . (J.· ·,t~'·' 
', l ·-/~~ • 
, 1;,?\ h . , . . ; 
ignored during peace-time, only to be emphasizeq.and re-
. ~. . 
. vered during ,iaro ·\ .. 
• eoThe State represents all the autocratic, 
arbitrary, coercive, belligerent forces, ~titbin 
a social group 0 · it is a sort of complexus er· 
of everything most distasteful to the modern 
free creative spirit,· the feeling for life, 
lib_erty and th~ pursuit of h4~p~piness. War 3. is the health of the Statao9 
/.Bourne saw quite clearly~=certainly more clearly than 
Dewey and the rest of the···intelle·ctuals--the toughness 
of State power and 1 ts role in ·society, a point he so~ht 
to make clear through his semantic breakdown. Further 
thziough the defini t1ona he could e.ffectively clarify the 
failures and potentials of American society.95 The most 
serious difficulty involved in constructing the State 
concept was Bourne's explanation of it as mystical. He 
might better have placed it firmly within a concept ot 
elitist politics such as the theo~ies developed in re-
'· 
cent years by Samuel Hays and the social anaiyais school 
of' historians. The essential groundwork upon which to 
base any such theory did not exist, however, and Bourne· 
probably tu.rned to the mystical-quality theory as the 
most logical explanation open to him. Nonetheless, it 
.. ,.I':~ 
' f·· 'I 
-1~ 
Bourne had looked at the concept of State outside the 
mystical, he might have seen the State as merely a govern- ~ 
94 Ibid., po 264. 
95The idea of differentiating the three concepts, how-
ever9 ,ias by no means ne1111 for him~ since it had appeared 
as early as 1912 in his senior asse~y, 88 Tha Doctrine of the 
Rights o:r ~!an as Formulated by Tl1.omas Pe .. ine 11 n p.rasented at 
Columbiao Mary Eileen Tomkins 9 ruRandolph Bourneg Majority 
of OneS) n unpublished doctoral dissertation, U11i versi ty of 
Utah, 1964. 
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ment l'thich has aggregated unto 1 ts elf certain arbi tpary 
and allaa1nclus1 ve po-vrer·s, thus throwing a· very d1ff erent 
light on the problamo 
Bourne 9· as a creative 1nt.ellec.t.11J.al, was fully capable 
of facing the problems of his society and the uncertainty 
-
of a pragmatic life, but there were few who could match 
. 
. 
ihis strength. To most, the respons1b111ti~s of citizen~ 
ship bore too heavily.and this was especially true of 
l 
those of the II significant classes 81 who were responsible 
for governing. By_turning to the State-ideal, these 
76 
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-people could dispense with the desire· and necess1 ty to 
· make decisions; they could revert to a ·rorm of political 
childhood under the protection of the parent-~tate. The 
· dynamics of a coercive, centralized State did away with 
the need for decisive leadership, replacing it with a 
self-perpetuating bureaucracy. Instead of the 1ndividual-
1sm of a democratic society the State-ideal substituted 
the confoI'lility of the herd.96 
-In his references to the herd mind, Bourne meant 
. primarily the signi:rioant classes. He was well aware of 
the class nature of society and had incorporated this 
pattern into his thought even before entering college. 
Its first appearance in his writing was 1n the Atlantic 
article on Bloomfield derived from his master's thesis in 
which he pointed out that governmental decisions rarely 
96The concept of the "herd" was probably derived from Gustav La Ban's The Crowd and Wilfred Trotter's Instincts 
of the llerd, both of which Bourne had read. 
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· .· · have anything to do l"Ti th the majority, but depend. upon 
' 6-· 
····the feeling of the eliteso97 Nor did he have any illu-
sions about the individual 8S~=or even a group 0s~~poten-
. tial t·o b~·aoout change in societyo nThe State acts 
. as a whole, and the class that controls governmental 
machinery can swing the effective action of the herd as 
a whole. 1198 Because American society is a class society, 
thoSe beyond the narr~w c±lcle of power could have no 
hopes of reshaping policy. l . ---
Bourne couid· never have been accused of having · 
been unrealistic about the support that could be expected 
for anti-war activities. He was quite aware of the ef-
fect of the "herd-mind" in bringing people to support· 
the war just as he realized that the individual counted 
for little in modern society.99 Nor was there any group 
or class which was large enough and in a sufficiently 
-untenable pbsition t.o risk revolt; precisely the phenom-
enon which has given American society its (to the radical) 
provoking stability. He was quite aware that the.basic 
motivating factor·1n politics is not idealism. At this 
point, Bourne might have been condelI?.lled for having admit-
ted exactly the point on which the pro-war 1ntellectJals 
... '. 97Bourne's conception of "significant classes" is 
nothing more than a general statement of the type of 
theories which historians o:r the social ane.,lysis school have been pu·tting forth in the past fe1.1 yearso Bourne, 
"The Social· Order in an Ame1"'ican Tolin, n ~tla11;tic Monthly:, CXI (1913) 9 227-360 ·· 98Bournes no The 5tate9 OQ Po 26le 
99nvlhether -vre shall act in the interests or ourselves, 
or of society iSoeoan entirely academic question," nOld 
Tyrannies, ua The ~lo~ld of Randolph Bourne, po290; see also p.~298. 
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had criticized him; by refusing to support th·e war, he 
· surrendered any possibility of remaining inside the cir-. 
· · ·. cle of powero Nevertheless 9 there remains tl1.e essential· 
. distinction--Bourne realized tha.,t those il).tellectuals 
themselves stood essentially outside this sphere. Sim-
ilarily, he had no _illusions about the workability of 
'•. 
democracy in the United States. To sp~ak o~ democrat1oally 
declaring war, Bourne felt, was lUdioruous. Not even in 
.,A. 
the most democratic of nations had the executive ever 
. been turned down by his legislators when he asked for a 
declaration of war. _Foreign policy, pragmatically con-
sidered, was completely in the hands of the executive; 
a republic revealed little difference from the most ty-
rannical country 1n this~regard. ~'The present demand for 
de~ooratic control of foreign policy indicated how com-
J· 
. ~,.. r 
. pletely, even in the·most democratic of modern nations 
foreign policy had been the secret pr1~ate possession of 
the· executive branch of the government. ••liO Bourne felt 
100Bourne, "The State," p. 262. In February and March 
. of 1917 three advertisements appeared on the pages of 
the New Republic calling Tor a rejection by the American 
people of the war with Germanyo The ads, signed by 
Bourne 9 Amos Pinchot 9 ~~ax Eastmen9 and \vintbrop Do La~e, 
accused the business community of maneuvering for 1r1ar, .. .:-::.,/;;:l 
and c~ntended that the majority of people opposed war. 
The ads further called for a referendum on any declaration 
of war ( the +-1ei1 R,e«l)J.lbllQ 11 JC ( 1917) 9 82 9 1451) C ? J ) o In-
spite of Bourne's signature on these ads 9 there can be · 
no doubt that he had absolutely no faith in the outcome 
of a popular referendumo The indoctrination and build~ 
up by the administration and pro-war camp was certain to 
mean defeat of any such proposal 9 or a popular vote for 
war in the event that a referendum could be heldo 09 o ct .A 
popular referendum se_ems so supremely irrelevant to peo-ple who are willing to use war as an instrument in the 
ttorlting-Otlt of nationa.,1 policy a 00 ( 18A' 1\;;lar Diary 9 tu Po38). 
Af~er ~~e appearance pf the first ad. Bourne received a 
1\:. 
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l.. ·---tha t there was an apathy among certain ciasses regarding 
the wa:r\, .but this had little signi-~:ticance because the 
government and the classes ensconced in power did not 
need the support of the peopleo · Only the support of the 
. . 
significant classes ms.,ttered. "All that is really needed 
is the cocooperation with government of men 1r1ho direct 
the large financial and industrial enterpriseso oalOl 
. ~:,,. What the masses of people 1r1a.,nted counted for nothing at 
all, for those who had not ~en gulled into the herd con-
.. formity were helpless to effect policy. Patriotism, wrote 
Bourne, was an outmoded concept; the government needed 
not consid~r whether people wanted to fight or understand 
what they fought for, "but otµ.y whether they will · tolera:t,e 
fightingo 11102 Furthermore, the situation was used by 
· those in power to perpetuate their positions, the State 
~ i concept becoming an instrument to that end and used to 
the benefit of a :r;,a:bticular class while the herd, under 
the emotional influ~nce o~ a useless patriotism, supported 
the s11tire structure. F-0r a radical like Bourne,. nothing 
could have been worse than to see the class he most de-
tested enshrined in power, supported by the masses and 
· · the intellectuai/. 
letter from Mrct R. F. Bourne of the Bourne-Fuller { iron and steel) Coo of Cleveland, Ohio 9 protesting Randolph's support of the ad and \adding:- 80 o o o It is \ti th the greatest regret that I fIDnd one with ~Y family name a party ~o this appealoooo 11 (Ro·,.,,·Fo Bourne to Re Se Bra, 5 Febo.1917, Bour11e Ma a o ) 
l012Bourne 9 °A \var Diary, 
11 p. 38. 10 Ibido 
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·. As is/ invaria.sbly the case, t.he people of the United 
States could be roused to extremes ·o:r devQtion9 fervor, 
,·,., •· ,· .. , ,•. ,· ,,' ,, 
and ser-vice for the destruct~yeneas of war which they 
<>, 
-,\_ 
could never match in constructive peace-time service~ 
And as is the reaction df radicals generally 9 Bourne de~ 
plo:red t·he fact that for a war of 88 offeniji ve self\=de-
f ense 9 18 the co~ntry could rise .... to t,he highest level of · 
collective effort ever known by means that should have 
~ 
/~ '-., 
· , · been sufficient to dissuage any intelligent person from . 
; ,,... 
. -, ;. ~ . 
~ advocating 1 t. The nation in ttar-time drove towards an 
enforQed uniformity that sacrificed the creative values 
. _ot: life--a.rtistic creation, knowledge, reason, beauty, 
the enchantment of life--and set about coercing ~11 
those l'Tho deviated from the norm. The variet·1es and the 
qualities in the fabric of Ame~1can society Which Bourne 
\ :found so attractive and valuable to American society 
were, under.the compulsions of war, to be reduced to a 
bland conformity.· Since the State must be conoeI'ned with 
the development and use of desti,1ctive po~ers and tech~ 
niques bec·ause "war is a vast complex of life-destroying 
and 11f'e-cr1ppl1ng forces, 11 the State-ideal is dangerous 
to any who seek reform and a better way of life or even .. 
to those who seek to prese:rve the cultural variations 
of .American sociatyol0_3 The--Btate and war are inextr1-· 
,--
cably bound together in a destructive pattern; ouindeed, 
,.) 
1t is not too much to say that the normal relation of 
,. 
' "' 
103Bourne, "·The Staie, 11 P• 261. 
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States is war. 11104 Even in time of peace, Bourne · sa,1 
the State-ideal as rendering diplomacy not a means of 
•'\ preventing war, but a method of gaining_ the upper hand 
until the State c·an again indulge 1n active t1ar. In the 
words of William James who presented the 1dea · s~everal 
years earlier; " ••• the- battles are only a sort ot public 
.. ~ . :· "-
. ··, . 
verification of the maste~ gained during the 1peac·e·1--in-
terV'al0 11105. On this point, Bourne permitted himself to 
be some1vhat carried awf?ay, f'or even though the State• s ·. 
animus was_ever toward-war, he had written that the State-
ideal exerted its elf only during wa.r-timersuggesti%ng that 
diplomacy did serve f9r.more than merely war without the 
bloodsheq.. Nonetheless, he w~s certainly correct in 
pointing out the power politics and gain-orientation 
\ 
. bound up ~1n diplomacy. Furthe·rmore, Bourne noted that· 
war was not a spontaneous thing like a quarrel between 
children, but rather a very artificial situation depen-
, 
dent upon the existence of the· State. He would invariably 
' have agreted with a remark made by lfoodrow Wilson in 1916: 
., 
"I_ sometimes think that \it is t,rue that no. people went 
. 
to war wi_th another people. Governments have gone· .,to war 
with one another;•• except that behind the government 
·_stood the State.106 Consequently, there could never be 
a hope of ending war without at the same time ending the • 
/ 
81 
0 
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,··~-- State which \-IOUld yield the added bener1 t o:r liberating 
the "genuine "11fe-·enhanc1ng i'orces of the nation."· 
'.'J, 
,' . " . :__ , , , _I 
I ·~ ' If 
-- 1041b · d 266 105 - 1 •' P• • Uames, Pe 7. 
10601 ted in Vlish, P• 40_3. 
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Basically Bourne's argument against the State is. a .. ·' 
.,. 
. .,, 
. ~ 
4 
r 
. ·{ ·. 
· rejection of tl1ose elements in Ameri~a .. n socie:ty ·.which.· 
-
, ,, endanger i, the individual v democracy., and culture . in any 
w~yo ·T'1e most ·obvious threats of the State and a~ eliti~t t 
. 
< class were mat~hed by the danger involved in foreign 
. 
policy 1r1hich Bourne discussed implioit~·y in the analysis .•.. . .,. 
. 
- ~ 
. 
His· contentions that81war is the heal th of the State" and 
that diplomacy is nothing more than bloodless warfare 
' indicate his dissatisfaction with the handling ot a-·:'1'er-
eign policy toa~:inuch oriented· to1t1ard gaining mastery 
' 
. (_~ 
· over other ·nations and' too 11 ttle c.oncern~d \vi th the 
., 
'D 
•• 
.  . 
I.. 
r 
. ./ 
. ·1 
. . . 
rea1ly important work for peace. Perhaps in the eight-
e:enth and nineteenth centuries, the Uni~ed States had 
been forced to follow a policy of undeviating se1f-1n-
terest, but with the growth of American power and pres-
,,. 
... tige, the policy could have been shifted and d1p1omacy 
1 . 
. might have become more than a tool of offensive defense. 
In other words, policy makers could have looked toward 
a creative pol~cy of gain within a ~tatus quo framework. 
• 
A dynamic and peaceful foreign policy could have been. ·~ 
devised, Bourne suggested, but certainly n~t within the 
;_ context of the State ideai. 
;11 The State" · represents a rather dramatic shift in 
~ emphasis in viewing American history and society, espe~ 
. cially ,11thin the· ~ramework of progressive democratic 
1dea1isme Bourne's analysis reveals not on~y a belief 
in the existence of a power-=elite · class system quite 
. ' ' 
. · b~yond the Marxist cl~ss view, but aiso a denial that . . ·~ . ; · . .:.r . 
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· .American his:t,ory represents the ever successful march of __ · 
democracyo On the contrary, he saw genuine democracy as 
having been° denied in t·he Un:L,ted States as the result· of ' 
. 
.. 
-
the .. e;roW:th of an elitist C1aas systemo l07 Within the 
· ( contex~ i~f · this system9. the State ideal was permitted J ,, . 
• 
.. ' 
. to remain alive. · Both of· these views ·l'tere strikingly 
. outside of the· ,main current of thought at the time, al-, 
though ,Bourne did have a precedent fqr his viev1s on 
· American history in the ,1ritings of J. A.llen Smith, Algie . 7 
• 
. ' 
l 
' M. Simons,~ and -especially Charles ,-~Beard, the: latter cer-
... \. 
. tainly acting as.a strong influence on Bourne's thought. 
' . Although the delving.into history shows some faulty gen-
. eral1za.t1on, · it is basically a highly perceptive analysis . . 6 
/'"~ for that period, and especially for a non-historian. Con-• A. ' 
sidering~, however, Bourne's concern with' democracy, in.;. 
dividualism, a.nd culture, ft 1~ very likely that he. 
, 
' 
wou·ld have come to some analysis such as "T.he State" re-
. ~ 
gardless of the suggestive writings of other intellect-. 
uais.. If Bourne was wrons 1n his analysis of the State, 
it was more a matter of degree than substance. He was 
quite correct 1n attacking the coercivf!J, illiberal, author-
"1tar1an, and war-oriented aspects of the State, but tras 
107Bourne saw the American Revolution as setting the stage for a potential experiment in democracy that would lead away from the State ideal and evontually ·bring the United States to a point where the State ideal no longer played any roleo But this 1r1as prevented by the 18most successful coup d a etat in history88 --the adoption of the Consti tutiono Since then 9 he 11rote,;, there hai.s been an assurance of upper-cla~s· control, consolidated by the party system: in effectfl a real de~ial of genuine demo-oracyo See 18 The State, 1 , Th;~ 'tr1orld of Randolph Bourne, Part II, pp.271-85. 
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. not awax-e that these elem~nts:. (1.~ ... th\ State ideal) would 
. ., 
.. , . 
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jr ' ~ 
.. ;, 
si}fueday come to dominate society 1n peace as ~well as in 
' ,.,.--.r· 
waro What Bourne meant·by the State ideal is little 
: ., 
~ : . - . 
more. than modern fasimm. · 
.. . . . .· .«IC ... 
( . 
The sum total of' Bourne's wa.r-t.ime w~1 tings was ~. 
· . ·., critic1sm--nea.rly- a. savage r,e.1 ection--of American · societ~, 
, 
' 
~ the poi~t to which the· genuine radical so often comes. 
' ' . 
• By remaining .outside the mainstream of action, he assume4 
·the role of critic·, of skeptic, and saved himself from 
the frustrating fate of the pro-war intellect~als. By 
. '-::- ' . 
. 
.. 
· ;·: :. allying themselves so_ closely to. Wilson and his po1.ic1es, · 
ij, 
l· 
-
they ensured that the pablic reaction against the Pres--
ident should include them as well • 
.., ' 
In attempting to 
/ 
'I 
deal with a socia1 irrationality by means of rational 
intelligence, they'left themselves open to the public re--
. '
"':. action to their failure, while Bourne from the ·outside 
' 
could be accused, of little save that his criticisms were 
correct. Nonethe1ess, some of his critics have condemned 
_o - ·108 
him because he stood apart to analyZ6 and criticize. 
,i 
... t • 
108 · . · 
1'\ • Most of thosa who 11.ave done woY'k on Bourne--wi th the 
. exce-otion of his :rriends--have 'found fault with hi·s stand. 4 . 
as critico The harshest attacks upon him were by his con-
temporary.·/Harold Laslti~ nThe Liberalism of Randolph Bourne,.11 · 
- Freeman 9 I {1920), 237-8, .and more recently, by Madison 9 
·· l'fri ting during the same_ period as Mad1sopi) a#nd probi;tbly 
strongly infiuenced by the Second World War, were two 
writers who·were mildly critical of Bourne: Max Lerner 
and Louis Fillero The more recent work by John Ae Moreau 
and ~!ary Eileen Tomkins is also rather critical of Bourne's ) 
-posi tiono 
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· He ,has been accU:~ed of~succ~l>ing to a.n unconscious re-
' ,: ,, 
' 
. 
-volt again~t that impotence·to which the vast machine ot 
· war reduced the 1ndiv1aual" and this is at basis correct.10.~ ·· . 
p ' 
. The. critics then proceeded to~ point out that Bourne · 
should hav.e remai~ed w-1th1n t~e power structure~ in an 
0 
attempt to. change the course·' of events; · they branded 
., 
him. unpragmatic for not doing so, totally ignoring ~he 
.... 
points which Bourne himself made ag~inst the intellect-
-
u·als who supported the war. H·1s analysis of the State· 
made 1t clear that the individual's potential to redirect 
. policy is practically nil, that once·/ set in motion, t.he 
. 
-war-technique develops a momentum th~t the individual 
is powerless to effect. Even if he had not isolated him-
self from the mainstream of American 11.fe, there 1s 11ttl-e 
_.,. 
"'"' 
. ' ' likelihood that he could have in any way gained access 
'~ 
. 
' to the means of power to effect any change at all; he 
was quite.beyond any possibility of becoming part of the 
power-elite. Culturally rather ~~an ;t,ol1tioally oriented_, 
generally considered a socialist, and totally antagonistic 
to most of the prevailing·trends in American life, Bourne 
was aware that his.role in society would be restricted 
~ 
to that of skeptic and cr1 tic. s-everal years before he 
had expressed this opinion: 
• :or Want to be a prophet if only a mihor ~ne, 
I can el,lmost see no-vr that my path 1n.11f:e will 
. be on the· outside of things, poking holes in 
the holy, criticizing the establishedp satir-izing the self~respecting-and contentede N~ver being· competent to direct and manage any affairs 
l09Lask1, P• 237. • .• . --.:. 
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. . . of the· world mysel:f, I will be forced to sit oft --\" 
by myse1·r .in the wilderness, howling like a co-
yote that eve1~ything is being run wrongo . I · . 
..thin,k I have a,, real genius for maki~\~rouble, . for getting under people f 8 skinso G CD e%l0. . 
. 
. 
.. 
muntly speaking, Bourne rev.er real·ly. had a chance to· 
)--
be part of tb.e power-elite, being excluded by his out,~ 
J look and',··probably by h·is physical ~appearance as well. 
_..., 
In t~is ,l.1ght, his isolation may well have been far more 
~, . V "'"I . ~ 
r· . 
~ 
valuable than any imagined reform activity o~ atte~t to () 
alter the direction .of the war. Rather than being, ·as 
· some of his critics have suggested, a.i_ tragic f'igure, ... 
; Bourne was one of the few distinctly ,rital individu~ls. 
. 
. 
·of the pei'ltod. His critics deplored in Bourne 
' 
'1 
••• precisely the qualities which .. made [him] 
a significant figure: his ruthless~ uncompro-
mising respect for the truthg and.his willing~ 
ness to follow out to the/ logica1~:--end t).~ the. 
consequences of his analysiselll 
,/ 
Although he had bee1>me disillusioned with society fie~ 
. 
. { 
never turned against 1 t completely. As the war ended, 
: 
\ 
Bourne's outlook and hopes for the future brightened as 
-he began planning newprojects. 112 Perhaps the pOst-wa.r 
· 1 
years would have don·e much· to dim this optimism, but his· 
l~OR. s. B. to Pruden·ce Winterrowd, 2 Mar. 191. , Bourne 
Mssi·'<also ·The World of Randolph Bourne, fl• 298. 
: . l lDwight MacDonald 9 no Randolph Bourne, Poli ti s, I (1944) 9 350 This article is really a double review of 
. the--·boolts of Filler) and :ternerp both of which MacDonald 
treats in a most devastating fashion~ finding both books 
total·lY inadequateo . He accused both rauthors of writing like '°·maiden aunts cludking over a beloved but 1s11a~1ard us· 
, nephe,., o . . 
1120n 21 November_ 1918, for 1·nstance, Bourne i1rote to 
his mother: 13 Noiv- that the trrar is over people ce.,n speak freely again and ,1e qan dare to thinko Its [siq] like 
coming out of a nightmare. n The 't'iorld O·f Rando1ph Bourne, 
· p .• 326. 
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( 
death on 22· December-1918 ma~e the question academic. I ' '.·,, 
·. The war f~r Randolph Bourne was, the catalytic} agent·· 
J· 
-~ 
.. 
-,p,roducing a. coalescence of his thoughts in -the form of' • ' .. 
J 
• 
questi-ons which 1neva tably confront the _intellectual in 
-, .. 
. . ' time .of wa.r. His contempora.,ries ·remained seren~ly un-·· 
. 
~ 
• ~ •.J 
.. 
• 
~ware of th'ese, .. ·question.s . until they had passed through 
r 
h 
.. -
_· <if ·. the experience. · Their .failure had·· been one of ·method-
,. 
, 
·, olo_gy. as much as it had been -of ends, for they accepted ~ 
. . .::·-.-'] . 
.. the very. thing ·tnat Bourne ~ound unacceptable--they ado~ted 
~ 
. ' 
~ . 
. 
... war as an ipstrument of na~1onal policy. He could con-
ce1ie of turning to wa.r as a final, desperate resort, but. -!'· 
·& 
as a method o·f bringing a_bout social progress,. it· was 
D 
insanity. War was Qou,nd to,·have a decidedly negative 
r. 
effect on American society and ~culture, and consequently, ,· 
) ' 
' ·, had to be rejected except as a:r.r o~y-·.alternative, a sit-
uation which surely did not e~st in 1917. 11 The war--
or. American promise: one must choose. One c·annot be in-
I terested in both. for the ef~ect of the war will be to . 
' t 
. · 113 . impoverish American promise." The war brought to an 
' . end j~t those ~hings th~t formed th~ body of Bourne's . 
. ,_{ 
. 
. 
~1nt·erests, almost all of which were. cultural rathar than .~ 
poli t1ca1. ·-,,._His central' concern had never been w1 th ide-
. ologies but rather with the pragm~tic results of war and ... 
. ~ pe~ce, the former pepresen~.ed coercion, frrat1onal1 ty, · de-
l~ ~ ...... : 1J 
.~. I 1:-"\...., ,, •,._ s't,ruotion while ·'·the latter 9 ~.1 reason, c~eati vi ty, and· pro-
(, I 
, gress. Instead of the bright hope~ of 1914, the 1ncompe-. \~ 
\\ 
· 
113Bourne, "A War Dftry ,!' P•. 46. 
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. ·tency of an ''over.,fntellectualized!f President and'.the·. 
.. 
-
' 
' blind~ess of those in power- had b:rC?ught Amerlca into the 
~ 
·· war with .th~ . r·es_ul t.,. that .~"tb.a whole era has beenb spirit- · 
/ ually ~astedo 11114 
" 
' J 
' . 
. 
. ·· The issue of the 11ar became one of· too,, thine own ¥ 
self be. true'! · Dewey was true to his own values, as was · 
" 
Bourne to his, .but the one operated within t{he system 
' 
' 
' 
' 
. '' \ 
and w·as just as powerless to affect meaningfttl change 
as t~e one·operating outsid~·the sy$tem. The ma3or 
' 
' point was not that· Bourne was mo~·e realistic then Dewe;:, -
0 
• 
. i):,r 1n ad9pting a. position that Stood in direct, contras;> 
to the prevail~~end~~ of American society, he was in 
the gen~ral sen.se less realistic. U,ther the key point ~ 
a is that Dewey had to surrender certain basic values in 
~ order to be a ~realist, wh·1le Bourne could not accept any 
~uch situation, the values remaining to him primatty. But 
-
" 
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the pinning of labels has ~11 ttle · real mean~ng, for Bourne's \ _,_ 
.... ·'. ,. 
view of' the world included a\sense of value' and quality .. 
whicn ~s rapidly passing from the American scene_. It 
was th,is quest for qua.11 ty that shaped hj,s attitudes, his 
# 
.. 
radica1-ism, his opposition to- the war. And it was this 
!) 
. element of his ·thought ,ihich the liberals the~ as now 
failed to take into account. ' 
~ 
. 
Randolph Bourne had begun his ·wr1 ting career by 
~-
' 
Jc 
making.youth his cause 9 emphasizing the misunderstanding 
,, 
of the elder. generations 1ookingr~at, y9uth. Hi--s~rticles 
/ .. 
·. ll4Bourne, "The W~r and the Intellectuals, 11 p. 6.· 
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stressing the cult o~. y·quth--the radicalism that he saw. 
as· 1 ts essence 9 1 ts sense ot fre;edom-=c=formed a partia1 
¥ 
\ ... 
,, ,,, ,,.·p ·011. I•_·. " ": ,,. ·I•,_"'· ,, ,, ·• basis for his war.articleso .The war was to ·Bourne a be-· .. 
'., ,· 
·.,; 
·~ ~ 
· · tro.1y~1 o·r youth by age, a betrayal· rtt1b.1ch 1i·1as a·~personal 
i 
- If ,, .. > 
(f . ,,.. 
· affront to him as an acknov1ledged spokesman f.or youth. 
' . 
····.··War int~ded into his personal lif_a to destroy. all that 
. -~ ·. 
he found worth~1hi-le, just as· he knew 1 t int:rt1ded into 
th~ lives of so ma11y ·others. The l;)etrayal \ta.s magnified. 
·. by the complia?J.ce~.;of the intellectuals. 1 Bourne saw in 
yout·h t,he qua~ities he once thought end~mic to the intel-
,• 
lectua1:· the rejection of tradition and conformity in 
.. 
turn for pragmatic int~lligence and free individual ex-
,, 
.~., 
· pression. What 1·s needed, he wrote, 1s ·not the nicely 
.. ... . 
. ' 
• l • . 
~· - . . 11 
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~ conforming, ster.eotyped mas,s man, but an individual who . ' ... 
~ '1? • ..,.~ 
,- will think.and act independently, act radica.lly. 115 ,biis 
is precisely what he demanded -of the intellectuals; what 
he had expected of .them. "The youtlg radical today is not 
• 
' 
-asked to be a martyr, but he is .askea to be a th~nker, 
· ~ . 116 "' 
· an intellectual le.adero" His ·life and writings point 
. 
out so vividly the probl~m of tne int·ell·ectual anclthinker· 
~- ·., . 
,:";<..:·· ., ...•. 
/ . / 
. ; •. • ': ,r 
. l ... 
. . . 
i~a cantralized modern soqiety. 
. . 
To succumb to the pre~ .. 
. ,. ,., -.. . ,. - .. , ....... , .. . 
1. 
• I 
-
. ' . 
I 
va1ling trend could lead to nothing other than frustra-
·-
tion or hypocrisy; to stand apart meant impotence, but· 
pragmatically no more·so than to partici-pateo The di:ff'er..; 
'I 
enoe lay in the satisfaction ( if at times a,false ea.tis-· 
ll5B·ourne 9 "The.Dodging of Pressures," Youth a.nd Li:f'e, \ 
PPo 249=87 o . . . 
ll6Eourne 9 vuThe Prie1~:1 of Radi·c-alism, an vlar and the In-
tellectua~so f O ~ ppo 14o-l; reprinted from the New R~E~Q-
11c, VI~ (March 1916), 161. 
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f'aot1o·n)· the ·one Sa41ned rrom part1c1pat1on ~nd the d1s-
. \ 
"' 
·comfort the other experienced ~from obstructionismo .. For 
;:'.\ "'-,:;;· 
t.he true 1nle11ectual 9 ho'l.·1ever;'""1t would seam...ther~ could 
- tJ-',~ ' 
be but -one real alterna ..tive and ·the~ critics of Bourne must 
' l ' . b 
... be put· in· the . same class with the intellectuals. 1r1hom he 
l / l<r . . 
.... , . 
. attackede:tc=ith~y had. no valid conception of the realities 
of po,1er and · the indi vidua1 us potential to. control. gov-
. • • • t .. 
-~rnmental policies. Bourne~as,· hoviever, callin~ for· a ~ 
type of whioh he was one of·the few existing examj)les--
.., 
, ' 
. an intellectua+ jlho 'devoted· himself to thought· and· fo·11owed 
his .. ideas through to their conclusions, standing· in·Joppo-
~ . · e1·t1on to the cons·ensus. whenever necessary... He repre.:. 
sented a-new phenomenon on the American ·1ntelleotual 
. . 
· ~_oene, .: perhaps best styled t·he genuine radical intel-
.,. 
J1ectual,. \-tho felt· ·that he otould do his best by standing · ' 
~ 
ap·art as a critic in the spittit of N1etzscl1.e's remark: v 
. ,' 
117 . ., 
."To attack is a sign of good intentions." Bourne's· 
.J ~ 
conception of the intellectual and his role in society 
was tha~ of .:.the critic, s~~ptic, and creative think~r, 
. 
always sufficiently objective to see the naw.s in what-
. I' 
, .. ever mass movement might prevail at the mom~nt. Certainly 
such a person. should be exc-leed:ingly -vrary of participation 
in mass movements lest he end as Bourne's contemporaries.·~ 
''Our intellectuals hav_e. f~iled us· as· value ,creators, even 
. ' 
The pro~war intellectuals 
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func'tions ~1hich Bourne conceived 
,('? 
~~~-- _,- ... ll7scblissel 9 • 11 IntrodUction, 11 Th~ World 9f Randol12h 
. Bourne, Po XiCXo 
- II8Bourne, 0 Tw1light of Idols,, 88 p. 6, .. 
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as their ·ma1n .. purpos1e; tney failed because they permitted. 
., 
themselves to be ·dec.eiv~d 9f:?y a techniqueeaC91}SOiOUS phil- ·~ 
. osophyo Instead of ·value;-s and the quslity of life, they 
. ~ 
· · · alloiqed themselves to drift on the stream . o·f. events, 
concerned only with t·he t-e·chni cal., Undoubtedly Bourne.' s · 
\ ! 
·,! 
~cadem,10 contempQraries. disb~liev~d his pre~ictions 9 but 
I • t .,. . ' I . . 
w1·th every d~y, he became -nrightez,. 11 -, -All he had tiri tten 
. . ~ - .. '.') ' . . 
. . I . . . 
.._, ' ! • • • ' 
. . " 
·, seemed to be. corroborated by the war ~and the disillu-, 
\ - ~ 
•• • J ~ 
si~ning years of the twenties. 
.. 
Over the years since Bourne wrote, his writings have 
. ~ 
repeatedly come into prominence with radicals and·non-
conformists. His wor~ had proven·to have--at least over 
the course of a half century~-a greater~durab111ty than· 
. ' / 
1;,he work of his contemporaries with the excep.tion of 
·' (\ -
• . ~ . • ,I , , ~' ,o>I '\ 
.Pew~Y•. The publication of two collections of'" his w~rk, 
.~.!.,~·· 
r,;/_..,. 
issued within· a- year or ~one another,· ceptainly indicates 
\. 
. ' 
a recent resurgence of ~nterest ~n the work, suggesting, 
r a ·relevance for modern readers. : In a similar vein, the 
periodic appearanue of some of Bourne's essays, and par-
ticularly "The State; H l;.e:ads~to the question of just why, 
if the essays are so wrong, they conti~ue to at~z:act new 
readers. 
,, 
Just what is there about th~se essays that con-
/ 
- tinues to attract readers? 
The question is·~ not such- -a difficult one. · Anyone 
'-~- .•. · .. _· : familiar' with the· •gene~~l 'tone' of ~Bourne's ,iork shoulq. 
' ' ~ . ,- ~ 
-· ___ -____ : . be· able to-. provide a ·fairly intelligent guess at why 'the 
· essays co~tinue ·to. be .. popular.1~9. The answer ·1s not, 
,, 
119 ~ - ,'' · 
. For a. typical misunderstanding and fa11ure to com-
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\ ·, ."'• •,' ,,,, however, to be found in a look at Jtis\the.wa.r essays 
..... ·~ . 
n 
. (or any_ other specific group of his ?says), but rat~8r .· 
; . 
. ,-/ 
1~ _the tota11·ty of all the e·ssayse - Bourne 8 s iiri tings 
-. all stre~s the· need · for a return to tQ.e· quality ,of- human 
. ~ . • J 
. . 
. existence rather than the materialistic values which ~ . . . 
. 
·'· 
- ) hav_e since become dominant. It· is far from unusual that 
' . 
. 
. 
. 
. Bourne wrote when he did, for 1tiw:~i3 precisely the peDioa.· 
of the First World _War during which the })a~sic patterns -· ' . 
~ V 
of life were ~eing so drastically changed for so many. 
· Nol" is 1 t surpriS1ng that he reacted as he did to Dewey• s / 
pragmatism, when the latter could write: "Pragmatism 
~ ,. 
.. is content to take the stand with science; for science 
'-,.. . . ~ ~-
. 
finds such events [o-f 11:f'~~, to b~ subject-matter of des.a 
\ 
cription and inquiry--just li~e stars and fo:ssils, mos-
, ~ 
· . ..120, quites and malaria, c;irculation· and vision. - There 
. is in the descr1pt1~n, no mention of Values .·.,Or concern 
. 
-· 
With the quality of life, although this is not to·'say_ -
that ~ewey was not con~erned _with those aspect~ of his 
"' phil9sophy~-but society wasn't. "There is nothing in the 
. outlook [or tho~e who favored w~] tlaa.t touches in any 
" 
way the happiness of the individual, the vivifying of 
1 ~ 
' 
• ·"' 
.. 
. r-; 
personality, the c_omprehension of soc·ial · forces, the flair 
' 
. 
' 
for art--in other words, the qua11 ty ~f· '11re. 11121 Dewey 
and the liberals may have ·seen gain~_ in the war, e.g .• 
.. 
. ·~. . .. " moving toward .the esta.,blishment .of ·an 1nt_ernat1onal order 
prehend the genuine releva~ce of Bourne 1 s ivork, see the 
revie\iir of J.ohn Ao }}1ore~u 1 s piogra.,phy of Bourne by J·obn P. Dif~ins in the Americ~n 9tuartf,lrli 9· :X:IX_ ( 1967), 130-1. . · 
12~Dewey~ Creative In~elli5ence, P• 550 
~ourne, "Twilight .. of Idols," p. 63 • 
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, and the establ1ehment of federal regulatory ~genc1es, . 
. ~~··1 · . .-
but these had no bearing on the quality of life.o The·· ,, 
, / .. 
-price they paid "vTas too high :ror 1r1hat they got, as even 
,they realized after the war. Here is where the common 
. ' ' 
, I • 
bo11d is found with the p~esent day· radical, for the ob-
'· 
. ' . . . 
. , ", jections and protests are the same;: .. 't,,he ];'-eaction to a 
'.'.· . 
. ',: \ 
.. ··:·. •.•• '' .. , ... ' .. ~ valueless technology dres,s.ed in the :same <meaningless 
nineteenth. century rhetoric about democracy and freedom.122 
\. 
' } 
.. - .... 
.. 
'· 
It is because Bourne ·reacted· against the beginnings of· 
,.--;.-
\ • • to" 
:., ·what is today call.ed' the 11.American W!lY of life" that 1-4s 
-:'}\t-c'. .t ·. ;', " 
. .c._--}\1~ ··:·:_ work 1s so warmly ·received by radicals today. Indeed, 
. ·, . ; '\-) ' 
J' ·1 t is a leader of today's young radicals who· ha.a used ·a 
.f~-
! 
. .. 
·, 
I 
term wh,ich might best be· applied'..to ~Randolph_ Bpurne--
• 
that of humanitarian liberal, to suggest a genuine con--. 
_.:._ 
cern w1 th human values 1n a society_ that is coming to 
· . . 123 be less and 1ees concerned. 
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122For an · excell~nt short discussion o-r the radical 
"Movementt' today, see Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau 9 The 
Na:w _Radi
0
cal.s:: A' Re12ort wi ~h ·Documents= {Ne\i' York~ 19bb}. 
l23C~rl. Ogl.esby, "Let Us Shape the Future, n \ Liberation, 
XI} (1966) p lca5e 
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